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ARTICLES
A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF PROSECUTION
BRUCE A. GREEN* AND REBECCA ROIPHE**
Scholars have failed to arrive at a unifying theory of prosecution, one that
explains the complex role that prosecutors play in our democratic system. This
Article draws on a developing body of legal scholarship on fiduciary theory to
offer a new paradigm that grounds prosecutors’ obligations in their historical
role as fiduciaries. Casting prosecutors as fiduciaries clarifies the prosecutor’s
obligation to seek justice, focuses attention on the duties of care and loyalty, and
prioritizes criminal justice considerations over other public policy interests in
prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining decisions. As fiduciaries,
prosecutors are required to engage in an explicit deliberative process for making
these discretionary decisions. Finally, fiduciary theory offers some insight into
prosecutorial regulation by clarifying that both accountability and independence
are aimed at aligning prosecutors’ interest with that of the public. This, in turn,
leads to the conclusion that proper regulation should aim to maximize both and
helps identify when one might be more beneficial than the other.
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INTRODUCTION
Generations of scholars have failed to arrive at a unifying theory of
prosecution, one that explains the complex role that prosecutors play
in our democratic system. This Article draws on a developing body of
legal scholarship on fiduciary theory to offer a new understanding that
grounds prosecutors’ obligations in their historical role as fiduciaries.1

1. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual
Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 209–10
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (contrasting fiduciary law with contract law
and arguing that fiduciary law “cannot be understood on the contractarian model”); Paul B.
Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra,
at 63 (defining the fiduciary relationship through a powers-based theory); Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (providing
an overview of fiduciary principles while arguing that analogizing fiduciary obligation with
contract principles is a faulty approach); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 425–27 (1993) (explaining fiduciary duty through a
contractual perspective, noting that the duty of loyalty common in fiduciary relationships
“replaces detailed contractual terms”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795
(1983) (analyzing the history and nature of fiduciary relations as a group rather than by
type of fiduciary); Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary
Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106 (2014) (investigating the intentional obligation of loyalty
in fiduciary relations); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2002) (providing a uniform theory of fiduciary duty by
differentiating between fiduciary and nonfiduciary relations and “rationaliz[ing] the
content of fiduciary obligations”).
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This effort in turn contributes to the scholarship on fiduciary theory.
While scholars have used fiduciary theory to analyze the role of public
officials, including judges, they have not applied it to prosecutors, who
serve a fiduciary role not only as public officials but also as lawyers.2
We bring the theory to bear on two related but intransigent problems
that preoccupy scholars of prosecutorial ethics in the United States. The
first of these problems is how prosecutors should make discretionary
decisions, especially regarding charging and plea bargaining.3 The
second is how prosecutors should be held accountable for making these
discretionary decisions without compromising professional independence.4
In making discretionary decisions, it is unclear how prosecutors ought to
identify relevant considerations and balance competing public concerns.
Unless we understand how prosecutors should balance these various
interests, it is difficult to determine how to hold prosecutors accountable
for failing to do so properly. Even if we could agree about what constitutes
a failure of discretionary decision making, preserving prosecutorial
independence requires some sacrifice in monitoring and accountability.
Recently, scholars have theorized unique qualities about fiduciary
relationships. They explain that all fiduciaries have discretionary
power over the beneficiary, who is inherently vulnerable.5 Beneficiaries
are asked to trust their important interests to the fiduciary, in part

2. E.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 117, 117 (2006) (applying fiduciary principles to administrative law to minimize
abuse of discretion); Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
699, 705 (2013) (applying fiduciary principles to the public law context and to the
judiciary, specifically); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513 (2015) (discussing a kind of fiduciary relationship in which the
fiduciary is charged with pursuing abstract interests instead of the interests of a person).
3. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–78 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors’
offices should take their cue from administrative law by separating functions and
increasing supervision); David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 480–83 (2016) (noting that prosecutors have
vast discretion and that prosecutorial power has only increased over time).
4. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 959–60 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors’ offices should change
internal structure and management to regulate prosecutorial discretion); Angela J.
Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 393, 408–12 (2001) (arguing that prosecutors utilize unrestrained discretion—
that has no historical or constitutional justification—to engage in misconduct that
leaves victims with little to no remedy); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States:
Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 963–64 (1997).
5. E.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 69–75.
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because monitoring costs are usually high.6 Scholars have drawn on
this work to develop a theory of fiduciary governance, in which public
officials, a different but related brand of fiduciary, often serve an
abstract interest on behalf of the public.7 Prosecutors fit this mold
because they pursue the public’s abstract interest in justice. Scholars
and critics have pointed out both prosecutors’ vast discretion and the
very real potential for abuse at the public’s expense.8 While scholars
have advanced different theories of prosecution in this country,9
viewing prosecutors as fiduciaries is more consistent with historical
understandings and has a greater practical value in shaping our
understandings of what prosecutors should do and how we ought to
hold them accountable.
Most agree that prosecutorial discretion is an inevitable aspect of the
criminal justice system, but there is little consensus on how prosecutors
should prioritize competing concerns. Prosecutors tend to make
decisions in an impressionistic way, weighing multiple interests that
may be in tension, such as the interests in truth-seeking, legality,
deterrence, retribution, proportionality, equality, efficiency, and
economy. Respect for the legislature’s judgment in defining particular
conduct as a crime may suggest enforcing the criminal law whenever a
crime can be proven, but the legislature assumes that prosecutors will
not prosecute every guilty person because a punishment in a given case
may be unnecessarily harsh or costly. Prosecuting a particular
individual may deter that individual and others, but this abstract
benefit may not be worth the literal costs of the prosecution, not only
to taxpayers but to witnesses, jurors, and others. A conviction followed
by imprisonment would achieve deterrence but at a greater cost to
6. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706.
7. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 565–78 (illustrating that while distinct from
private fiduciary law, public fiduciary law is applicable to the judiciary, the executive
branch, and the legislative branch).
8. See Davis, supra note 4, at 436–39 (arguing that the “breadth of prosecutorial
discretion” available in the charging power leads to selective prosecution and other
forms of prosecutorial misconduct that have yet to be adequately addressed by the
Supreme Court or through other accountability mechanisms).
9. See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(arguing that prosecutors owe an obligation to the law); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism, 90 S. CALIF. L. REV. 237, 253–54 (2017) (explaining that prosecutors
should enforce constitutional protections for defendants when the adversarial system
fails to do so); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 612 (1999) (arguing from both a historical and contemporary perspective that
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice).
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both the accused and the public. When multiple interests are in
tension, the challenge is to identify some decision-making criteria and
processes for prosecutors to employ, beyond simply “taking everything
into account,” both to give prosecutors guidance and to give the public
a basis for judging how well prosecutors are exercising discretion.
Courts and scholars of prosecution in the United States agree that
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice. Fiduciary theory helps make
that obligation less amorphous. Prosecutors, this Article argues, are
fiduciaries who represent the public but are appointed or elected to
pursue a particular abstract public interest, the interest in justice.10
Viewing prosecutors as fiduciaries, against the background of fiduciary
theory, makes three principal contributions.
First, this analysis focuses attention on the fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty that a prosecutor owes to the public as a beneficiary or
client. These duties are not incorporated in the duty to seek justice,
which speaks to the public’s principal objective in a criminal case.
These are further (but underexamined) duties that address the
manner in which prosecutors should pursue the public’s objectives.
Analyzing duties of loyalty and care shows that ordinary regulatory
processes are less robust for prosecutors than for other lawyers and
other fiduciaries generally, in that they fail both to define the nature
of these duties and to enforce them. From a normative perspective,
this leaves a host of unanswered, and potentially controversial,
questions about how prosecutors should conduct their work as
competent and disinterested public officials and professionals. From a
regulatory perspective, the implication is that, for prosecutors, a
premium is placed on alternative modes of accountability.
Second, fiduciary theory helps to narrow the appropriate considerations
for discretionary decisions. It does so by reminding us that there may be
relevant considerations that are not central to the prosecutor’s fiduciary
obligation to pursue the public’s interest in justice. There are
considerations that are intrinsic to determinations of justice, meaning
that they bear directly on the justness of a particular prosecution.
These intrinsic considerations include avoiding wrongful convictions;
treating people proportionally and equally; and using the process to
incapacitate dangerous individuals, deter future offenses, and secure
retribution and restitution for victims. Extrinsic concerns, on the other
hand, may be relevant to a particular prosecutorial decision but are not
10. See generally Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 523–24 (explaining that the role of
public fiduciaries often involves pursuit of an abstract interest on behalf of the public).
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central to the justness of the case. These extrinsic concerns include
foreign policy implications of a particular prosecution or its intersection
with immigration policy. Prosecutors must balance intrinsic concerns in
light of the law, traditions, and facts that are necessarily inaccessible to
the public. They can also consider public concerns that are extrinsic to
the justness of a particular case so long as doing so would not result in
injustice. The fiduciary obligation to pursue the public’s interest in
justice makes that abstract goal primary and renders all other extrinsic
public interests subordinate. That prosecutors must mediate among a
constellation of interests,11 and give priority to criminal justice interests,
limits the extent to which prosecutors with different values can diverge
in their approach to decision making.12
Third, fiduciary theory helps narrow the range of proper
prosecutorial regulation. A related challenge in regulating prosecutors
is achieving a proper balance between prosecutorial accountability and
independence. It is essential to hold prosecutors accountable when they
fail to fulfill their obligations because the potential for harm is so grave.
For example, prosecutors at times fail to comply with the constitutional
duty to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense or abuse their
authority in deciding whether to institute criminal charges or to plea
bargain.13 Although critics call for greater accountability to address
these abuses of power,14 both the structure of American government
and the rule of law itself require prosecutors, like judges, to be
independent of those who might otherwise hold them accountable.15

11. Id.
12. Cf. Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 770
(2018) (“The paradox of ‘progressive prosecution’ is that the criminal legal system is
an oppressive institution. Attempting to make the ‘most powerful’ actor in such an
institution more progressive seems to miss the point.” (footnote omitted)).
13. Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 59–60 (2016).
14. See Barkow, supra note 3, at 874–84 (outlining prosecutors’ adjudicative and
enforcement powers and explaining how the accumulation of these powers is
problematic); Davis, supra note 4, at 395–448; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 469–78 (2002) (discussing the
pros and cons of various methods for regulating prosecutorial conduct); Ronald F.
Wright, Reinventing American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. 395, 396–99 (2017)
(explaining prosecutors’ role, along with the complicity of the legislature, in
expanding the incarceration rate).
15. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the
Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that federal prosecutors are—
and must be—independent of the President).
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It is more than just a theoretical concern that if prosecutors were
subject to direct oversight and control by other government actors,
politicians might seek to use prosecutors to do their partisan or
personal bidding, which would undermine prosecutors’ fiduciary
responsibility to pursue the public interest in achieving justice.16
Independence also requires some distance from factions of citizens
with well-articulated interests, and it even requires that prosecutors be
insulated from (although perhaps not oblivious to) a public consensus
in favor of a particular act or outcome.17
Striking a balance between prosecutorial accountability and
independence is particularly difficult when it comes to charging and
plea bargaining because these decisions are both momentous and by
nature discretionary. When prosecutors, as trial lawyers, act unlawfully or
abusively in the manner in which they conduct criminal investigations and
proceedings, courts have constitutional and inherent authority to hold
them accountable.18 As a practical matter, courts tend to be circumspect
in their oversight of prosecutors’ investigative and trial conduct, but at
least as a legal matter, courts have considerable authority both to define
and remedy prosecutors’ trial misconduct and to sanction prosecutors for
wrongdoing in their role as advocates.19 In contrast, courts do not regulate
prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions except in the most

16. See id. at 55 (describing how the professionalization of the DOJ emphasized
independence of prosecutors from partisan influence); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe,
May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction from the President?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1817 (2019)
(discussing the “consequences for prosecutors who receive the president’s orders”).
17. This is essentially, on a more explicit and grander scale, the kind of
independent role that all lawyers are supposed to play. Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–30 (1988). For a discussion of a judge’s
failure to maintain this sort of independence from the public, see Bruce A. Green &
Rebecca Roiphe, Punishment Without Process: “Victim Impact” Proceedings for Dead Defendants,
FLR ONLINE (2019), https://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
Green-Roiphe_November_FLRO_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE9N-V5WX].
18. See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 322 (Conn.
1995) (rejecting the claim that disciplining the state prosecutor would violate
separation of powers); State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 1099, 1105 (Kan. 1999) (affirming the
trial court’s order holding the prosecutor in criminal contempt for failing to comply
with discovery order). See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 14, at 405–12
(describing federal courts’ authority to regulate federal prosecutors).
19. Green & Zacharias, supra note 14, at 403–05 (explaining how federal courts
can directly and indirectly sanction prosecutors by reprimanding them off the record,
instituting fines, or negatively interpreting a particular prosecutor’s arguments).
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extreme situations.20 These discretionary decisions, which implicate
prosecutors’ role as public officials more than as trial lawyers, are free
from judicial review largely because judicial interference threatens to
undermine prosecutors’ effectiveness and inordinately entangle courts
in executive branch decision making. And yet, in many ways, decisions
about whether to initiate and dismiss criminal charges are prosecutors’
most significant ones both for individual defendants and for the
community and, therefore, are the decisions for which prosecutors most
need to be publicly accountable.
In addition to shedding light on how prosecutors should approach
decision making, fiduciary theory offers insight into how to achieve the
proper balance between accountability and independence in the
context of criminal prosecution. While at times in tension,
prosecutorial accountability and independence are not contradictory
aspirations. Both accountability and independence are mechanisms to
promote and protect prosecutors’ core fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty. Each addresses risks that threaten to distort prosecutorial
adherence to the needs and interests of the public in achieving justice.
While fiduciary theory does not provide an algorithm for determining
when to emphasize one over the other, it may help to craft an
institutional design for prosecutors’ offices that can maximize both.
A key and often controversial question in determining the proper
balance between accountability and independence is how much
control the public ought to have over prosecutors either directly or
through other public monitors. Fiduciary theory may help solve this
puzzle in two ways. First, fiduciary theory helps clarify that both aims
are designed to ensure loyalty to the client, and second, it helps
determine which sorts of decisions need to be insulated from popular
input and control. The fiduciary obligation for prosecutors is to pursue
the public’s interest in justice. The public should not have direct input
in determining and weighing considerations that directly bear on
criminal justice in particular cases. These traditional criminal justice
questions are embodied in decisional law and the Constitution and
developed by the traditions and practices of prosecutors over time. The
discretionary power of prosecutors at the core of their fiduciary mission
derives from making these sorts of calculations in the best interest of the
public rather than at its behest. Extrinsic considerations that might also
20. See Davis, supra note 4, at 435–37 (describing how the Supreme Court has
promoted expansive prosecutorial discretion and discouraged challenges to
prosecutors’ abuse of the charging power).
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affect prosecutors’ decisions, such as foreign policy questions or the
intersection between prosecution and immigration policy, are less
central to prosecutors’ fiduciary mission, and there is no reason why
the public either directly or through other elected officials could not
have more input into these secondary public policy concerns.
Part I of this Article offers both historical and theoretical bases for
drawing on fiduciary theory to explain the U.S. prosecutor’s role. From
an historical perspective, prosecutors were, at times throughout early
American history, regarded as fiduciaries.21 Thought of as repositories
of a public trust, prosecutors are, like public officials generally,
fiduciaries. But most of these historical references are used as a
rhetorical flourish. They do not offer much in terms of content for the
unique relationship that prosecutors have to the public. For many of
the same reasons that theorists have cast public officials, including judges,
as fiduciaries, prosecutors too can be characterized as fiduciaries—that is,
as professionals who hold a trust and wield considerable discretion on
behalf of a vulnerable beneficiary. Drawing on the fiduciary theory of
governance, this Part concludes that while prosecutors’ beneficiary is the
public, prosecutors serve the public not by satisfying the preferences of an
amalgam of citizens at a particular moment in time but by pursuing the
abstract public interest in justice that is, and ought to be, elaborated
within prosecutors’ offices over time.
In Part II, we examine prosecutors’ role as a fiduciary, focusing on the
core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. This exercise illuminates the
complexity of prosecutors’ role, particularly in making discretionary
charging and plea-bargaining decisions. Rather than simply relying on
intuition, prosecutors should explicitly and consciously consider
particular relevant factors. For the idea of justice to develop more
particular meaning over time, the policies and practices that surround
the duty of loyalty and care must be articulated, reviewed, and revised in
the context of individual investigations and prosecutions. By exploring
the complex nature of discretionary decision making, this section
highlights the importance of both accountability and independence.
Finally, in Part III, we consider whether fiduciary theory helps determine
how to enhance prosecutorial accountability and independence. We
conclude with cautious optimism. Fiduciary governance mandates a
balance between insulation and responsiveness. Prosecutors should be
insulated from direct popular control but only insofar as that allows them
21. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 565–78 (explaining that public officials often
served as fiduciary on behalf of the public).
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to develop stable norms and principles governing decision making. To that
end, oversight should include a mechanism for ensuring that prosecutors
are explicitly weighing proper concerns in making discretionary decisions
and developing more concrete goals and priorities that give substance to
the mandate to do justice. That oversight requires not only some degree
of transparency but also reciprocity. In other words, prosecutors ought to
serve as educators, explaining the value of the norms and traditions that
govern their work.
I. PROSECUTORS AS FIDUCIARIES—HISTORY AND THEORY
A. The Historical Background to U.S. Prosecutors’ Fiduciary Role
The shift from private to public prosecutions in America could be
seen as a shift from a private service model to a public fiduciary
model.22 In the Middle Ages, crime was originally seen as a personal
offense, a wrong inflicted on the victim.23 This view persisted through
the nineteenth century in England and America. Private prosecution
in England was justified, in part, as a restriction on the power of the
Crown.24 While a limited system of public prosecution developed over
time, England did not officially recognize public prosecution until
1879 when the Office of Public Prosecutions was created.25 In
nineteenth-century England, however, even private prosecutions were
thought to be brought in the public interest: the prosecutor “has as
much a public duty to discharge as the sovereign himself, and has a
public trust to exercise.”26
The American colonies borrowed significantly from the British
system, and early prosecutions were primarily brought by individual
victims. Colonists similarly resisted the public prosecution model as
fraught with the potential for abuse.27 However, a growing population,

22. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Fiduciary Government and Public Officers’ Incentives, in
FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 146, 156 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018) (arguing that the
shift in public officials’ compensation from private to public funding demonstrates a
shift from a service model toward a fiduciary model of government).
23. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 357, 359 (1986).
24. Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 167 (1983).
25. Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22 (Eng.).
26. Would the Ends of Justice Be Promoted by the Appointment of a Public Prosecutor?, 4
PHILOMATHIC J. & LITERARY REV. 309, 345 (1826).
27. Cardenas, supra note 23, at 368; William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial
Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 653 (1976).
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increased crime, and the chaos created by laws giving rewards for
successful prosecution led to criticism of private prosecution and calls for
a public alternative.28 Critics of private prosecution emphasized that the
system introduced problems, as crime victims and their paid advocates
sought unfair financial benefit.29 By the American Revolution, many
colonies had moved toward partial public prosecution.30
Proponents of public prosecution in nineteenth-century America
emphasized how the private model vindicated the private interests of
parties at the public expense. Increasingly, the prosecutor came to be
viewed as a fiduciary of the public at large or of the public interest in
the abstract, not as an agent of an individual victim. There was a
practical significance to the shift. When the defendant’s guilt was
uncertain, a private lawyer might vigorously prosecute out of fidelity to
the victim-client, if not as a matter of self-interest, whereas a public
prosecutor would be expected to refrain from doing so to avoid
convicting an innocent person. In 1888, recognizing this concern, a
Wisconsin court declared private prosecution unconstitutional,
explaining, “[t]he prosecuting officer represents the public interests,
which can never be promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His
object, like that of the court, should be simply justice; and he has no
right to sacrifice this to the pride of professional success.”31 Another
court explicitly described the prosecutor’s role as a “public trust,
committed by the public to an individual.”32

28. Cardenas, supra note 23, at 368–69.
29. Id. at 369.
30. Id. at 371.
31. Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244, 247 (Wis. 1888); see also Meister v. People, 31
Mich. 99, 103–04 (1875) (arguing that prosecutors owe a “[d]uty of impartiality” that
is inconsistent with the privately funded prosecution).
32. State ex rel. Gibson v. Friedley, 34 N.E. 872, 875 (Ind. 1893); see also State ex
rel. Black v. Taylor, 106 S.W. 1023, 1027 (Mo. 1907) (refusing to allow the Attorney
General to “farm out” his obligations to private parties because prosecution is a “public
trust”); People ex rel. Peabody v. Attorney General, 13 How. Pr. 179, 183 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1856) (refusing to grant a writ of mandamus forcing the Attorney General to bring
an action on the application of a private party and stating: “Our legislature have seen
fit to invest the attorney general with this discretion. His office is a public trust. It is a
legal presumption that he will do his duty—that he will act with strict impartiality. In
this confidence he has been endowed with a large discretion, not only in cases like
this, but in other matters of public concern. The exercise of such discretion is, in its
nature, a judicial act, from which there is no appeal, and over which courts have no
control”); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34, 39 (Sup. Ct. 1847) (“[T]he office of the
attorney-general is a public trust . . . .”).
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Likewise, one of the founders of modern legal ethics, George
Sharswood, conceptualized prosecutors as public trustees—that is, as
fiduciaries of the general public. In 1869, he wrote:
There is no obligation on an attorney to minister to the bad passions
of his client; it is but rarely that a criminal prosecution is pursued for
a valuable private end, the restoration of goods, the maintenance of
the good name of the prosecutor, or closing the mouth of a man
who has perjured himself in a court of justice. The office of the
Attorney-General is a public trust, which involves in the discharge of
it, the exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who
stands as impartial as a judge.33

While analogizing prosecutors to judges in their obligation of impartiality,
Sharswood did not otherwise specify prosecutors’ fiduciary obligations as
holders of the public trust.
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the private service
model of prosecution was entirely supplanted. Private prosecution
persisted for quite some time in the United States, and remnants of it
still exist.34 Meanwhile, early concerns about the dangers of political
control of prosecution expressed by proponents of private prosecution
subsided but did not abate.
At the end of the nineteenth century, professionalism emerged as a
way to address concerns that prosecutors would use the State’s criminal
justice authority to promote narrow parochial or partisan interests.35
Prosecutors, as professionals, would be constrained by ethical norms,
experience, and training not only in their actions but also in the
process by which they make decisions.36 Just as judges draw on judicial
norms, such as those governing the interpretation of statutes and
application of precedent, prosecutors too look to evolving written and
unwritten prosecutorial traditions.37 These contemporary understandings
are consistent with the idea of the prosecutor as a fiduciary who exercises
discretion on behalf of others who are vulnerable and dependent. This
understanding also offers a rationale for subjecting prosecutors to
33. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 95 (3d ed. 1869).
34. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 413–15 (2009).
35. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 49–55.
36. Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory and Legitimacy, in
FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 163, 165–66 (arguing that what distinguishes
legitimate fiduciary relationships is limits on the fiduciary’s cognitive function).
37. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Accountability, 2004 Wis.
L. Rev. 837, 870–83 (describing prosecutors’ decisions making based on principles
derived from legislation, the purposes of criminal law, and elsewhere).
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normative constraints intended to minimize the risk of self-dealing and
other abuses of discretion.
B. Theoretical Background
The theory of fiduciary governance has drawn on the private law and
theory of fiduciaries to develop an understanding of the role and
responsibilities of public officials, including judges.38 As lawyers
appearing in court on behalf of a client, prosecutors are fiduciaries in
the most classical sense. But like other public officials, prosecutors are
also a different sort of fiduciary. Instead of serving a defined interest
of a particular beneficiary, this fiduciary administers the law on the
public’s behalf in furtherance of an abstract public purpose.39 In
deciding whether to initiate an investigation or criminal charge, to
plea bargain or to dismiss a prosecution, prosecutors do not take
direction from clients or defer to clients’ objectives. Nor do they
engage in ministerial acts. They exercise discretion as other public
officials, particularly judges, do.
The fiduciary relationship is defined as one involving discretionary
power and structural vulnerability.40 Trustees, for instance, exercise a
great deal of discretionary power over the beneficiary, who, as a result,
is vulnerable to abuse. A hallmark of the relationship is trust, and
monitoring costs are usually high.41 Prosecutors fit this mold. Scholars
and critics have pointed out both prosecutors’ vast discretion and the
very real potential for abuse at the expense of the public.42
Arguments that judges are fiduciaries are largely applicable to
prosecutors as well.43 Prosecutors have been described as quasi-judicial

38. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 567–70.
39. In this role prosecutors are involved in administration for abstract purposes
rather than for an individual or set of individuals. Id. at 523. Miller and Gold put it this
way: “A fiduciary relationship is one in which one person (the fiduciary) enjoys
discretionary power to pursue an abstract other-regarding purpose . . . of another
person (an individual beneficiary or ascertained set of beneficiaries).” Id. at 549.
40. Miller, supra note 1, at 69–75.
41. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706.
42. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 4, at 961 (“Prosecutors have great leeway to abuse
their powers and indulge their self-interests, biases, or arbitrariness.”); Davis, supra
note 4, at 408–16 (surveying “prosecutorial discretion and how it is abused”); Bruce A.
Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L.
REV. 589, 606–18 (2019) (discussing why prosecutorial abuse of discretion is hard to
define and detect).
43. See Leib et al., supra note 2 (applying fiduciary principles in public law to the judiciary).
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officials—“minister[s] of justice.”44 In exercising discretion in the
criminal context, prosecutors both determine the relevant public
interests and decide how to balance and pursue them in particular
factual circumstances. In other words, their role is constitutive in
defining the abstract interest they are supposed to serve and
instrumental in furthering it in particular cases. Prosecutors do not have
a traditional beneficiary who defines the objectives of the fiduciary
relationship. They discern, and contribute to developing, the collective
understanding of justice as they implement it in any given case.
It is almost universally recognized that U.S. prosecutors’ duty is to “seek
justice.”45 But in concrete cases, it is a challenge to give substance and
meaning to this vague mandate.46 To some extent, the law establishes
the outer limits of this obligation by, among other things, restricting
how prosecutors acquire evidence, prescribing the minimum amount
of information they must disclose to the defense, and precluding
44. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.”). See generally Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 833 (2016) (contrasting “punishment-maximizing” prosecution
with “an idealized vision of the prosecutor as minister of justice”); Eric S. Fish, Against
Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1463–68 (2018) (describing the
significance of conceptualizing prosecutors as “minister[s] of justice”).
45. For a description and explanation for why prosecutors have a duty to seek
justice, see Green, supra note 9, at 633–37.
46. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 9, at 11 (arguing that the duty to “advocate for
justice” is too vague to give prosecutors meaningful guidance, and that greater
guidance is provided by conceptualizing prosecutors as “servant[s] of the law”); Bibas,
supra note 4, at 961 (“In theory, prosecutors are beholden to the public interest or
justice. These concepts, however, are so diffuse and elastic that they do not constrain
prosecutors much, certainly not in the way that an identifiable client would.”). Others
see prosecutors’ “duty to seek justice” as a useful starting point for ascertaining
prosecutors’ particular obligations. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 9, at 305 (“In the many
situations where judges are unable to fully implement constitutional protections,
prosecutors should step in and perform the task themselves. The theoretical resources
for this role can be found in commonplace maxims about prosecutors: they have a
duty to ‘seek justice,’ not just obtain convictions, and they are obligated to uphold the
Constitution through their oaths of office.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991)
(arguing that prosecutors’ duty to do justice implies specific obligations to compensate
for the inadequacies of the adversarial process); see also Lissa Griffin & Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301
(2017) (arguing for changes within the prosecutorial system to better balance
prosecutors’ roles as ministers of justice and advocates in light of prosecutors’
contribution to mass incarceration); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty
to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285 (2014).
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certain jury arguments.47 But within the confines of the law, prosecutors
have vast discretion. Some guidance may be implicit in the law.48
Professional tradition or consensus and office policies may also work to
fill in the gaps. But prosecutors interpret this guidance differently and
take vastly divergent approaches to discretionary decision making.
Identifying the prosecutor as a public fiduciary suggests that the diversity
of approaches may not be a problem as long as prosecutors follow a set
process for deliberately and consciously discerning and pursuing the
interests of the beneficiary.
This raises the question of who or what is the prosecutor’s beneficiary?
Fiduciary theorists have sought to define the beneficiary of judges,49 the
legislature,50 and administrative agencies.51 We know who the
prosecutor’s client is—the public entity named in the caption of the
criminal indictment (the United States, the State, the Commonwealth,
the People of the State, etc.). Is the beneficiary the entire public in the
abstract sense or some segment of the public? If so, is there a tension
between the prosecutor’s fiduciary duties as a lawyer and the
prosecutor’s fiduciary duties as a public official? Does the prosecutor
owe particularly strong obligations to some subgroup of the public, like
the victim, or even the accused? While the prosecutor’s beneficiary is the
public, the public’s objective in the criminal context is to render or
achieve justice; hence, the prosecutor’s duty as a fiduciary is to pursue
the public’s abstract interest in justice, which entails a constellation of
interests and values.
Prosecutors and other public officials balance competing concerns
of a complex group, but they also balance the interests of the public
with the needs of the State and the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system. As Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have argued, both
public fiduciaries and private fiduciaries are required to engage in a

47. See Fish, supra note 9, at 275–78 (describing ABA Model Rule 3.8 and state
model rule equivalents that impose requirements on prosecutors). See generally Green
& Zacharias, supra note 14 (detailing the various ethical rules implemented on the
state and federal level, along with other prosecutorial accountability mechanisms).
48. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 49–51.
49. E.g., Leib et al., supra note 2 (applying fiduciary principles to the judiciary to
analyze the role of judges in democracy).
50. E.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 676
(2013) (arguing that courts should apply a fiduciary duty of loyalty to political
representatives to hold them accountable for political gerrymandering).
51. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 466–68 (2010).
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careful balancing of competing interests. Tensions arise both among a
group of beneficiaries and between the beneficiary and the state.52 A
prosecutor, like other fiduciaries, could be seen as owing first order
obligations to the public and a separate second order fiduciary
obligation to the courts and criminal justice system. Alternatively, the
prosecutor’s obligation to the public, courts, and the criminal justice
system could all derive from the fiduciary obligation to the public. In
either iteration, fiduciary obligation shifts from loyalty to a duty of
fairness and reasonableness in this context. The prosecutor must be
fair in assessing the interest of the beneficiary and in balancing
competing priorities and values. Values embraced by some members
of the public might overlap with the interests of the State in a properly
functioning criminal justice system, while others may not. Prosecutors’
duties to fairly consider the interests of the public as a whole may
involve at least offering reasons for prioritizing some criminal justice
ends over others. Again, prosecutorial independence from powerful
majorities is crucial to preserve this discretionary balancing.
Drawing on fiduciary theory, this Article argues that the prosecutor’s
obligation is to pursue the public’s abstract and evolving interest in
justice. Other public officials may have a more defined mandate.
Administrative agencies, for instance, usually have a particular mission.
For example, the Federal Election Commission is tasked with enforcing
and administering the federal election laws.53 The prosecutor’s mandate,
in contrast, is vague and subject to multiple conflicting interpretations.
Even so, as fiduciaries, prosecutors are required to continually take part
in an ongoing process of exposition. This exposition ought to take place
according to the traditions and policies of the prosecutor’s office. Like
the limits of permissible judicial reasoning, these practices will limit
discretion and confine the process in a way that ought to reassure us that
we are not simply subject to any one prosecutor’s idiosyncratic view of
justice. At any given moment, there will be competing understandings, but
if prosecutors engage in a deliberate and transparent process of seeking to
define justice in a consistent and rational way within the context of the
traditions, policies, and practices of the office, that abstract ideal will gain
meaning, and hopefully some consensus, through practice over time.

52. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 67.
53. Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/
mission-and-history [https://perma.cc/EQ67-JVT3].
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One difference between prosecutors’ objective and the abstract
objectives pursued by most other fiduciaries is that justice is exceedingly
vague. In a donative trust or a corporation, the trustee’s mission may be a
group goal, like the goal of profit maximization in the corporate context,
but it is defined. Without such specifically designed purpose, one may
wonder whether prosecutors are doing anything other than indulging
their own personal views and priorities. In the context of prosecution,
what gives justice meaning beyond the personal view of the prosecutor
is developed traditions and practices of prosecutors’ offices. Monitoring
and accountability, therefore, must focus on the effectiveness of these
norms and practices.
If we define prosecutors’ objectives in this way, what then are the
duties of care and loyalty in the context of a criminal prosecution? In
the private fiduciary context, where there is a discernable beneficiary or
group of beneficiaries, loyalty can denote obedience to the beneficiary,
or it can mean pursuing the best interest of the beneficiary even if the
beneficiary prefers a different course,54 but, at the very least, it means
avoiding opportunism and eschewing the interests of third parties.
Unlike an ordinary fiduciary for a private party, but like other public
officials, the prosecutor does not exercise discretion for the benefit of a
person or even a group of people who can give guidance or direction.
If we conceive of the prosecutor’s objective as the abstract public
interest in justice, it becomes clear that prosecutors ought not operate
with conflicts of interest that threaten to warp disinterested decision
making on behalf of the public. We have argued previously that the
absence of such conflicts is the key to proper prosecutorial conduct.55
But even if they avoid conflicts of interest, how do prosecutors give
content to these duties when the law is not explicit and decisions are
entrusted to their discretion? Do the duties of care and loyalty add
anything to the duties identified with prosecutors’ role as ministers of
justice, and, if so, are these duties in tension?
This concept of the fiduciary obligation of prosecutors helps to clarify
the complex relationship between independence and accountability. As
Paul Miller and Andrew Gold explain, a public official is not policed by
the beneficiary (the public), but, if at all, by individuals and institutions
who, as co-fiduciaries, are assigned a monitoring role.56 In fact, there is
54. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 558–59.
55. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts
of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 (2017).
56. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 555.
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reason to maintain distance from direct popular control because
prosecutors ought not define justice by the interest of the collectivity or
any subset of the collectivity at any given time. Instead, they ought to build
on past understandings. In this way, the abstract purpose, like the
common law, is evolving and changing with time.57
For prosecutors, however, these cofiduciary monitors are few and
weak. The gap in monitoring is necessary because prosecutors must be
afforded independence from both political influence and popular
control to pursue even-handed justice. But given this absence of
external control, prosecutors must be held accountable in a different
way. Rather than imagining public officials entering into a kind of
contract with citizens, fiduciary theory helps highlight the need for
disinterested decision making by public officials and the attendant
need to avoid conflicts of interest that might compromise that neutral
approach.58 It further pushes us to recognize the need for mechanisms
of accountability that acknowledge the complexity of a fiduciary
relationship when the beneficiary is an abstraction (the public), not a
defined individual or group of individuals, and the beneficiary’s
principal objective is an idea (justice) that is a distillation of interests
shared by the public over time. The best form of accountability in this
context may be institutional in the following sense: prosecutors’ offices
must maintain required, transparent, and deliberate processes and
procedures for decision making. Prosecutors need not be transparent
about individual deliberations. But they must be transparent about
prosecutors’ compliance with these procedures and how the various
mechanisms within their offices work to align prosecutors’ deliberations
with the abstract public interest in justice.59
The virtually unbridled power in prosecutors’ offices is troubling.
The internal structure of these offices ought to be altered to improve
monitoring without compromising independence too seriously. That
said, imperfect monitoring is an inevitable condition of public
57. Id. at 526. Some have criticized the idea that judges are fiduciaries for abstract
interests like the law. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 702–03 & n.16. But this seems more
apt when it comes to prosecutors. The public interest in justice has to be defined over
time and with reference to prosecutors’ work, including the errors and misconduct
that has been exposed.
58. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 557–58 & n.132.
59. These mechanisms should work to ensure that the goal of justice and the
definition of that goal persists over time despite the change in the makeup of the
citizenry. How we understand justice may evolve, but it may not be radically displaced
because one set of citizens so chooses. Id. at 525.

2020]

A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF PROSECUTION

823

fiduciaries.60 The character of the fiduciary, the integrity of the public
official, is also critical to a well-functioning relationship.61 Therefore,
reforms should focus not only on transparency and processes, but also
on improving culture and education to ensure that those who wield
this sort of power use it prudently.
II. PROSECUTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Prosecutors’ fiduciary role is complex. As a public official, the
prosecutor, on behalf of the public, has authority to identify general
policy objectives in criminal justice and to decide how to pursue these
objectives in any individual case, including when, as is typically true, these
objectives are at cross-purposes.62 As a lawyer in the adversary process, a
prosecutor serves a more conventional fiduciary role. Within the bounds
of judicial procedure and other law, advocates ordinarily strive to
accomplish the objectives identified by their clients. In doing so,
advocates exercise some discretion to decide how best to accomplish the
client’s objectives while acting within the law. But even as an advocate, the
prosecutor’s fiduciary obligations are complex because the objectives to
be pursued on behalf of the public—the varying objectives that together
comprise “justice”—are often themselves amorphous, and because, while
the prosecutor is advocating for the public’s objectives in a criminal case,
the prosecutor as a public official is trying to ascertain those objectives,
which may shift or evolve.
In both roles, prosecutors owe the public fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty—the two core duties that fiduciaries owe their principals. In general,
these concepts have been underemphasized and underdeveloped in the
literature on prosecutors’ role and regulation. The literature addresses
both prosecutors’ adversarial role, including prosecutors’ legal
obligations to the defendant and to the court and prosecutors’ exercise
of discretion on behalf of the public writ large.63 But scholars rarely
identify care and loyalty as touchstones for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Intuitively, prosecutors’ duty of care or loyalty to the public
may seem insignificant since prosecutors have no identifiable client
complaining of being disserved or betrayed. Nonetheless, the fiduciary

60. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 708.
61. Id. at 712.
62. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 471.
63. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 9, at 244–48 (describing prosecutors’ position in the criminal
justice system both as adversarial and quasi-judicial); Sklansky, supra note 3 (arguing that
prosecutors are “mediating figures” who must balance between “law and discretion”).
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duties of care and loyalty help explain how prosecutors ought to exercise
discretion, particularly with regard to the crucial questions of whether to
bring charges and which charges to pursue. Emphasizing the prosecutor’s
fiduciary role may not provide concrete answers in individual cases, but,
as this Part shows, it has implications for how prosecutors exercise
discretion from both normative and procedural perspectives. The
complexities of prosecutors’ fiduciary role add to the importance of
developing mechanisms of accountability.
A. Prosecutors’ Duty of Care and Competence
Prosecutors have a duty of care both as public officials and as advocates.
As public officials defining the objectives of an investigation or
prosecution, prosecutors have broad discretion like that of other
executive branch officials in higher office, but they must exercise that
discretion in light of the public interest.64 Prosecutors must also exercise
care as advocates—for example, in selecting investigative techniques, in
preparing for trial, in selecting legal theories and making legal
arguments, in negotiating pleas, in complying with discovery obligations
and other legal obligations, and so on—in light of the public objectives
they have identified.65 One might expect that, at least in the advocacy role,
prosecutors would be subject to the same accountability mechanisms as
lawyers for private clients, who may be disciplined or civilly liable when
their professional work is so substandard that it violates the duty of care.66
But even here, conventional accountability mechanisms are likely less
effective. With an eye toward preserving prosecutorial independence,
both the law and legal institutions (i.e., disciplinary authorities and
courts) largely insulate prosecutors from external monitoring.67
For prosecutors, one potential monitor is the lawyer disciplinary agency
of the jurisdiction where the prosecutor is licensed. But discipline has
historically been ineffective in enforcing prosecutors’ duty of care.68 All

64. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 470.
65. Bruce A. Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy—The Prosecutor’s Role, 51 GA. L.
REV. 1179 , 1189–90 (2017).
66. Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
GEO. L.J. 705, 708–11 (1981).
67. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 874–75 (2012).
68. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16
(2009) (“In theory, prosecutors are subject to the . . . obligation to ‘provide competent
representation to a client’” under state disciplinary rules based on Model Rule 1.1, but
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lawyers are subject to a disciplinary duty of competence, which is enforced
selectively within the lawyer disciplinary process, typically in response to
complaints by disgruntled clients who can show extreme or systematic
neglect.69 Prosecutors, however, have no clients who can lodge complaints
with the disciplinary authorities, and complaints by criminal defendants
and their lawyers asserting that prosecutors were careless may not be
taken seriously. Disciplinary authorities will take judges’ complaints more
seriously. In other words, discipline of prosecutors for incompetence—
which, in practice, is exceedingly rare—will be limited to situations where
courts are aggrieved by prosecutors’ carelessness.70
Nor does civil litigation provide a meaningful oversight role for
prosecutors. Unlike lawyers representing private clients, prosecutors have
no aggrieved clients who might bring a malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty claim when a prosecutor performs carelessly. Criminal defendants
who are injured by prosecutors’ legal violations have a very limited right
to bring civil claims,71 but not claims predicated on mere negligence.72
Judges generally have authority to remedy and sanction lawyers’
wrongdoing in the cases over which the judges preside,73 but when
prosecutors violate the law through carelessness, courts are limited in
their ability to hold prosecutors accountable. In some cases, they can
provide juridical redress, which may be accompanied by public criticism

“[a]s a practical matter, disciplinary regulators have not implemented rules like Model
Rule 1.1 against prosecutors. Prosecutorial neglect has been regulated almost
exclusively through internal administrative sanctions or informally by courts.”).
69. See generally Martyn, supra note 66, at 712.
70. For a rare example, see Livingston v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 220, 224–25 (Va.
2013) (upholding discipline of prosecutor for negligently filing a succession of
defective indictments).
71. Prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for conduct in their
advocacy role, and they have qualified immunity for investigative or administrative
work. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–31 (1976). For critiques of
prosecutors’ absolute immunity, see Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni,
Backing Out of a Constitutional Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial
Misconduct Post Thompson, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1243, 1268–69 (2012); Margaret Z. Johns,
Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 106–07.
72. See, e.g., McGhee v. Pottawattamee Cty., 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 909 (S.D. Iowa 2007)
(stating that “mere negligence” is never sufficient to overcome qualified immunity).
73. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182–86 (2d Cir. 1981) (reviewing
remedies and sanctions available to trial and appellate courts for prosecutors’
improper closing statements).
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of the prosecutor.74 This sort of shaming may serve as an accountability
mechanism.75 But courts’ remedial role is an indirect and weak means
of accountability and one that many consider inadequate.76 Courts also
have authority to sanction individual prosecutors who violate the law,
but they are unlikely to do so where the violation is unintentional.77
Ultimately, courts play a limited role in elaborating and enforcing a
standard of prosecutorial care, and virtually no role where the lack of
care relates to prosecutors’ exercise of discretion rather than to their
compliance with the law.78
The lack of meaningful legal accountability inhibits the development
of understandings about what it means for prosecutors to perform their
work with care. Courts do not help define the objectives that prosecutors
are supposed to serve, whether in general or in any given case; nor do they
determine how prosecutors are supposed to achieve those objectives
other than to hold prosecutors accountable when they break the law.
Other lawyers look to their peers to determine the standard of care
because they are potentially subject to civil liability for negligence when
their work falls below expectations of other lawyers in the legal community
performing similar work.79 But no analogous legal mechanism encourages
prosecutors to compare their work with that of other lawyers.

74. See, e.g., People v. Velasco-Palacios, 235 Cal. App. 4th 439, 447 (Ct. App. 2015)
(upholding dismissal of indictment as sanction for prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence
during plea negotiations).
75. See generally Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by
Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 313 (2016).
76. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability,
and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 83–84 (2013) (maintaining that there is
“little incentive for offending prosecutors to refrain from future misconduct” when a
judicial remedy is afforded but no personal sanction is imposed for prosecutorial
misconduct beyond perhaps “a verbal reprimand”).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 148, 152–53 (D. Mass.
2010) (declining to sanction prosecutor for an “egregious error” in failing to disclose
“plainly important exculpatory information” because she was contrite and
subsequently educated herself regarding her disclosure obligations).
78. See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 143, 166–77 (2016) (reviewing small number of cases in which prosecutors have
been disciplined for misconduct relating to their charging and plea bargaining decisions).
79. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Price, 514 N.E.2d 127, 136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“[A]
claim of legal malpractice [is] based on an alleged failure to exercise the knowledge,
skill and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession
similarly situated . . . .”).
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This may not seem to be a serious problem when it comes to
prosecutors’ work as advocates. In a criminal case, one might think that
the prosecution’s objectives are obvious—for example, to secure a
guilty verdict at trial or to secure a guilty plea—and one might measure
the quality of prosecutors’ work by its likelihood of achieving these
objectives. Further, prosecutors’ advocacy appears relatively similar to
that of other lawyers’ advocacy, and therefore, the analogous work of
other advocates may establish a relevant standard. But prosecutors’
advocacy role is in fact distinctive, and it poses challenges because, at
the same time that prosecutors may be striving to secure a conviction, they
may have other, potentially countervailing, objectives, such as to avoid a
wrongful conviction and to ensure the defense a fair (not merely lawful)
process. Given these further objectives, some argue that prosecutors fail
to exercise adequate care when, although acting lawfully, they use
unreliable evidence, ignore or exploit defense lawyers’ substandard work,
or withhold information that would be useful to the defense.80
The challenge of giving meaning to prosecutors’ duty of care is even
more complicated because prosecutors serve as public officials,
making discretionary judgments such as whether to investigate,
whether to bring or drop charges, or whether to plea bargain. One
cannot measure the competence of these decisions by assessing how
well they achieve the prosecution’s objectives because this is the
process by which prosecutors define their objectives. Discretionary
decisions involve multiple and complex considerations. Further, these
are the kinds of decisions that clients ordinarily make in a lawyer-client
relationship. Therefore, one cannot look to the ordinary work of trial
advocates representing private clients to measure whether prosecutors’
discretionary judgments are or are not competent.
Nor, for the most part, can one look to judicial decisions and
pronouncements for a standard governing the competence of prosecutors’
discretionary decision making. The very premise of prosecutorial
discretion is that, when exercised within the law, it is not susceptible to
judicial review despite the “potential for both individual and institutional
abuse.”81 Even if ninety-nine out of 100 prosecutors would decline to bring
80. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors?, 3 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 515, 526–27 (2016) (discussing a prosecutor who, in exploiting unreliable
evidence, failed to “take reasonable steps to avoid convicting [an] innocent [person]”).
81. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). Indeed, even when
exercised in an unconstitutionally arbitrary fashion, prosecutors’ discretionary
decisions may escape judicial review. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296,
1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Our only available course is to deny the defendant a judicial
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charges in a case because the defendant’s guilt is too doubtful and the
likelihood of a conviction is too low, as long as the prosecutor meets the
minimum legal standard of “probable cause,” a court will rarely interfere
with the prosecutor’s judgment either through the adjudicative process
or through the disciplinary process.82 To say that the court cannot
overturn the prosecutor’s decision is not to say that the prosecutor
exercised prosecutorial authority competently. On the contrary, ninetynine out of 100 prosecutors, and 100% of judges, may privately regard the
decision as an egregious abuse of discretion. But the point is that there is
no legal process for developing and accumulating legal decisions, as there
is for private clients, to express the prevailing normative understanding.
Because the quality of prosecutors’ discretionary decision making is
not subject to meaningful legal review, other mechanisms are needed
to establish and enforce norms of prosecutorial competence.
Prosecutors might look to their peers within their office, or to other
prosecutors’ offices, to ascertain expectations. In general, the former
is more likely than the latter.83 The organized bar has developed norms
of prosecutorial conduct, including those governing discretionary
decision making.84 But, in part because of prosecutors’ influence, the
bar’s writings provide limited guidance. And because prosecutors
regard the organized bar as subject to capture by defense lawyers, they
may ignore these writings.85

remedy for what may be a violation of a constitutional right—not to have charging or
plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”).
82. See Green & Levine, supra note 78, at 164–65 (discussing the rarity of judicial
review of prosecutorial charging discretion). Recently, courts have been scrutinizing
decisions by progressive prosecutors not to charge in entire categories of cases. See e.g.,
Justin Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, Prosecutors Won’t Pursue Marijuana Possession Charges
in Two Northern Virginia Counties, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2020).
83. See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences
on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT 269, 279 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (“Prosecutors’ offices
are something of an exception [to offices’ tendency to converge on a single way of
working], partly because of their highly localized character. Since they are not directly
in competition for business, the homogenizing pressures are much weaker. They do
not adopt similar policies [regarding disclosures to the defense].”).
84. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARD 3–4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION] (addressing “Discretion in Filing, Declining, Maintaining,
and Dismissing Criminal Charges”).
85. See Green, supra note 67, at 898 (“Even if professional conduct rules might
legitimately regulate them, prosecutors suggest, the existing process for developing
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As for prosecutors’ accountability for upholding the duty of care, in
the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms, a heavy burden is
placed on prosecutors to regulate themselves, which is to say that we
rely on their professional commitment to standards of care as they have
come to understand them. Internal self-regulation by a prosecutor’s
office may be the most meaningful mechanism to ensure the
accountability of subordinate prosecutors.86 The elected prosecutor, or
chief appointed prosecutor, has a stake in the quality of the office’s
work and can therefore be expected to police both advocacy and
discretionary decision making by subordinate lawyers. But at the same
time, a chief prosecutor who makes discretionary decisions badly
cannot be expected to enforce a high standard of care but, on the
contrary, is likely to influence subordinates to make their own
decisions just as badly.
B. Prosecutors’ Duty of Loyalty
Like other fiduciaries, prosecutors have a fiduciary duty of loyalty.
As lawyers for the public, their loyalty duty may seem comparable to
that of a lawyer for a private entity. Unlike many fiduciaries for private
beneficiaries, such as lawyers for private entities who can take direction
from duly authorized representatives of the entity-client, prosecutors
are the public officials who make decisions for the public entity-client.
In this role, too, prosecutors are fiduciaries.
In criminal cases, there may be several threats to disinterested
prosecutorial decision making. One risk is that prosecutors will act in
their own self-interest at the expense of the public interest—a variation
of what Thomas Rave calls the principal-agent problem.87 Another is that
prosecutors will serve the private interests or preferences of identifiable
third parties.88 Although these concerns apply equally to prosecutors’
role as lawyers and as public officials, a third risk relates uniquely to
prosecutors’ governance role. In the context of governance, loyalty
generally means serving the broader purpose or goal of a community.89
professional conduct rules is illegitimate because of the influence of bar associations,
which are subject to capture by criminal defense interests.”).
86. See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1971); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as
Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1028 (2005).
87. D. Theodore Rave, Two Problems of Fiduciary Governance, in FIDUCIARY
GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 49, 49–50.
88. Id.
89. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 731.
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The risk is that the prosecutor will be influenced by a subgroup’s wellarticulated interest at the expense of the broader public interest.90 Rave
calls this risk—that a powerful subgroup within the group that comprises
the beneficiary can dominate at the expense of the others—the
tyranny-of-the-majority problem.91 The ordinary problem of subgroup
dominance is compounded in the case of prosecutors once we
conceive of the beneficiary’s objective as the public interest in justice,
the meaning of which develops over time by accretion in common law
fashion. Given that this objective is so vague and subject to
interpretation, there is a heightened risk that a subgroup’s exercise of
undue influence will be indiscernible.92
Scholars and courts assume that prosecutors must serve the public
and, at a minimum, avoid conflicts of interest.93 To some extent, this
expectation is codified in the law and enforced by legal institutions.94
Unlike lawyers for private clients, prosecutors are not subject to civil

90. Id. at 712.
91. Rave, supra note 87, at 49–66.
92. In general, it is hard to prove and defend against improper influence on
prosecutorial decision making because the process is so opaque. For example, the
Manhattan District Attorney recently disputed claims that criminal defense lawyers’
campaign contributions influenced the prosecutors’ decision not to pursue charges
against their clients, leading to a prosecutors’ reexamination of campaign finance
practices. See Elizabeth Holtzman & David Yassky, The Lessons of Cyrus Vance’s Campaign
Contributions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/
06/opinion/cyrus-vance-contributions-weinstein.html; see also CTR. FOR ADVANCEMENT
OF PUB. INTEGRITY, RAISING THE BAR: REDUCING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND INCREASING
TRANSPARENCY IN DISTRICT ATTORNEY CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING 18 (2018),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/publicintegrity/raising_the_bar.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXG8-4FHE].
Questions might also be raised about whether, and when, subgroup influence may be
appropriate. For example, prosecutors are obviously subject to the influence of the police
or other investigative agents. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 171, 191–94 (2019) (describing police influence on criminal justice decisions); Daniel
Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
771–72 (2003). Ordinarily, investigators’ influence over charging and plea bargaining
decisions may seem unremarkable. But their influence may be problematic, for
example, in cases where the propriety of police or investigative conduct is in issue.
93. See, e.g., In re Cole, 738 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ind. 2000) (finding that the
prosecutor “served a public trust to enforce the law” and “[t]he state is entitled to a
prosecutor’s undivided loyalty”); see also STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARDS, supra note 84, at STANDARD 3–1.3 (“The prosecutor generally serves the
public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit,
witness or victim.”); id. STANDARD 3–1.7 (addressing prosecutors’ conflicts of interest).
94. See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 469, 471.
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lawsuits for breach of loyalty. But courts require prosecutors to adhere
to the conflict of interest rules that govern lawyers generally.95
Constitutional decisions recognize prosecutors’ obligation to be
disinterested, which is another way of enforcing a duty of loyalty.96 Judges
exercise statutory or inherent authority to disqualify prosecutors, and
prosecutors recuse themselves, in some situations where there is a serious
risk that prosecutors will inappropriately serve private interests.97
Interestingly, the conflict of interest law seeks to preserve disinterestedness
in prosecutors’ role as public officials exercising prosecutorial discretion no
less than in their role as courtroom advocates.98
While incomplete and imperfect, conflicts of interest standards help
to ensure against the danger that prosecutors will seek to advance their
own personal interests instead of that of the public. Conflict of interest
rules are most likely to apply when a particular prosecutor is at risk of
engaging in self-dealing because the particular prosecutor has a unique
and tangible self-interest.99 For example, a prosecutor who has a financial
stake in a corporation would not be expected to make prosecutorial
decisions regarding the corporation. And a prosecutor who is a victim of
a crime would not be expected to prosecute the perpetrator.
Prosecutors’ obligation to refrain from acting self-interestedly poses
some interesting challenges, however, when the prosecutor’s interests are
intangible, particularly when it comes to the pervasive and unavoidable selfinterest in one’s own reputation and career advancement.100 Prosecutors
95. Id. at 484–88 & n.104 (citing examples).
96. Id. at 488–91.
97. Id. at 491–99.
98. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987)
(“[T]he fact that the judge makes the initial decision that a contempt prosecution
should proceed is not sufficient to quell concern that prosecution by an interested
party may be influenced by improper motives. A prosecutor exercises considerable
discretion in matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of
investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be
sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which
persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the
terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted
immunity. These decisions, critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made
outside the supervision of the court.”).
99. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 472 (discussing “personal-interest
conflicts [that] relate to a particular prosecutor in an idiosyncratic way”).
100. See id. at 480–81 (“Even prosecutors who do not seek professional advancement
are jealous of their professional reputation. This broad self-interest can come into play
in every criminal case in ways that are inconsistent with the expectations of
disinterested prosecution.”).
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almost always stand to benefit professionally if they conduct their work
in a manner that seems adept or successful from the view of their
supervisors or others. This could theoretically provide motivation to
carry out the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, but is often charged
that prosecutors are simply looking to put notches on their belts, at the
expense of the public interest in “doing justice.”101 Prosecutors cannot,
however, recuse themselves from cases where their professional selfinterests are implicated. Even if they could, it might be impossible,
given how vague the pursuit of justice is, to tell when a prosecutor’s
assessment of the purpose or goal of the public is tainted.
If self-interested prosecutors cannot simply be replaced by
disinterested ones, then how can prosecutors avoid or at least minimize
the effect of self-interest in decision making, and how can the public
hold prosecutors accountable when they fail to do so? It may be hard
for prosecutors themselves to tell whether they are acting in their own
self-interest since they can rationalize self-interested behavior.102 It may
be harder still for the public to determine whether prosecutors are
acting disloyally. Much of what prosecutors do is not publicly visible,
and the public can at best infer the motivations behind prosecutors’
visible conduct.103 Both from the inside and from the outside, it may
be impossible to disentangle prosecutors’ professional self-interest
from the public interest. For example, when prosecutors publicize
their successes, their intent may be to serve the public interest by
keeping the public informed and instilling public confidence in their
work. But it is also possible that prosecutors are indifferent to the
public interest and are motivated simply to promote their own career

101. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (2004) (“Prosecutors with the highest
conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the best performers) stand the greatest
chance for advancement internally.”).
102. There is an abundant literature on how unconscious thought processes—e.g.,
cognitive biases—influence prosecutors’ decision making. See, e.g., Susan Bandes,
Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 491
(2006); Barkow, supra note 3, at 883 (“Prosecutors may feel the need to be able to
point to a record of convictions and long sentences if they want to be promoted or to
land high-powered jobs outside the government, and that will affect their assessment
of a defendant’s case.”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603–04 (2006); Aviva
Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of
Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 425–26 (2011).
103. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV.
1775, 1784 (2011) (referring to “the opaque machinery of prosecutorial discretion”).
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ambitions. Not only is it impossible to assess prosecutors’ motivation to
hold them accountable for disloyalty, but the ability of prosecutors to
justify their self-promotion as an act of public accountability suggests a
tension between the duties of loyalty and accountability.
The problem of averting conflicts of interest is even more intractable
with respect to what we have called institutional conflicts of interest—
that is, situations where prosecutors have an incentive to serve the
institutional interest of the prosecutor’s office at the expense of the
broader public interest.104 Prosecutors’ offices have reputational
interests that may compromise their lawyers’ disinterested judgment—
for example, when the office has convicted an innocent person, its
interest in avoiding embarrassment may lead it to defend the conviction,
even though the public interest is in correcting wrongful convictions.105
Prosecutors’ offices may also have compromising financial interests—
for example, an office’s interest in benefitting financially from a civil
forfeiture may influence prosecutors to pursue a prosecution that
might be undeserved.106 These institutional interests may not be wholly
illegitimate, and in any event, prosecutors cannot recuse themselves to
avoid their influence.
The law also addresses conflicts of interest arising out of a prosecutor’s
personal relationship with a third person, such as a defendant or a
victim.107 Prosecutors are expected to avoid situations where they are
strongly tempted to subordinate the public interest to the private interests
of victims, suspects, defendants or others, although the law is not
necessarily coextensive with one’s intuitions about prosecutors’ duty to
eschew private interests. For example, prosecutors are expected to
recuse themselves, or to be disqualified by a court, when they have a
close familial or economic relationship with a crime victim, defendant,
or other interested third party.108

104. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 477–79.
105. Medwed, supra note 101, at 136.
106. Id. at 135.
107. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 472–73 (“[A] prosecutor’s familial relationship
to a defendant or victim may undermine the prosecutor’s disinterestedness, leading the
prosecutor to be unusually lenient where the defendant is a relative and unusually
harsh where the victim is one.”).
108. See, e.g., People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 205–06 (Cal. 2006) (finding that
court erroneously failed to disqualify prosecutor where member of prosecutor’s staff
was defendant’s parent); State v. Mantooth, 788 S.E.2d 584, 587–88 (Ga. Ct. App.
2016) (upholding prosecutor’s recusal where member of prosecutor’s staff was related
to the defendant).
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But prosecutors’ responsibility to avoid serving the private interests
of third parties is not so simple because fidelity to the public interest,
to some extent, presupposes care for interested private parties. For
example, it is assumed that prosecutors’ public obligation to pursue
justice includes concern for victims’ interests.109 Indeed, the ends of
criminal justice (which prosecutors are charged with serving) often include
restitution for the victim and retributivism, and procedural laws establish
victims’ rights which prosecutors must respect and, to some extent,
implement.110 What does it mean to say that a prosecutor owes undivided
loyalty to the public’s interest in justice if, at the same time, the prosecutor
has an obligation (though not a fiduciary duty) of care to the victim? Even
prosecutors may have difficulty resolving this riddle.111 Similarly, and
perhaps more controversially, prosecutors are supposed to have concern
for defendants’ rights and, perhaps, defendants’ interests; it is sometimes
said that, as public representatives, prosecutors speak for defendants
among others.112 Intuitively, one can understand that prosecutors, in
determining what is in the public’s best interest, should give some weight
to both victims’ interests and defendants’ rights without owing loyalty to
either. But, at the very least, this reflects a complication in prosecutors’
decision making that most lawyers for private clients do not encounter.
Finally, insofar as there is a risk that prosecutors will favor the interests of
a powerful or vocal subgroup, the law is essentially silent. As public
officials, prosecutors might be said to serve a purpose that transcends any
person or group of people: they serve justice, an abstract principle
distilled from the objectives of an abstract public over time, not the
objectives of any particular individual or even any group of individuals at
the moment.113 The fiduciary obligation to pursue the public’s interest in
109. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 182 P.3d 600, 611–13 (Cal. 2008) (finding
that it was proper for the prosecutor to argue in favor of minor victim’s privacy
interests, which were aligned with those of the State, and that doing so was not
tantamount to representing the victim).
110. See, e.g., People v. Subramanyan, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 447–48 (App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 2016) (holding that under Marsy’s Law, only the prosecutor, not the victim,
has authority to seek restitution or appeal a restitution order).
111. See, e.g., In re Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d 241, 245–46 (Ind. 2012) (sanctioning
prosecutor who, as a condition of a plea bargain, insisted that the defendant comply
with the victim’s demand for an excessive amount in restitution).
112. People v. Dehle, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The prosecutor
speaks not solely for the victim, or the police, or those who support them, but for all
the People. That body of ‘The People’ includes the defendant and his family and those
who care about him.”).
113. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 571–72.
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justice offers some guidance for prosecutorial discretionary decision
making. If prosecutors owed a general obligation to the public, there
would be no clear restriction on how they should balance various public
interests. Deterrence could be weighed equally with promoting good
immigration policy. Because, as fiduciary theory helps clarify, the
prosecutor’s duty is to guard justice, not the public’s interest in general,
however, it follows that considerations intrinsic to the justness of a case
ought to take precedence over any other public value. Thus, in making
discretionary decisions, prosecutors must primarily consider concerns such
as protecting the community, deterring future offenses, rehabilitating
offenders who can be reformed, incapacitating dangerous offenders, and
seeking retribution and restitution. Other interests extrinsic to the
justness of the prosecution, such as foreign policy implications of a
particular case or its intersection with immigration policy, are not central
to a prosecutor’s job. Of course, prosecutors can give those weight in
making discretionary decisions, but only if they can be advanced
consistently with the central fiduciary mandate to ensure justice.114
This insight can help explain why it has been acceptable to engage
in “spy swaps,” where the U.S. government exchanges a foreign
individual arrested or charged with espionage for a U.S. citizen or
valued non-citizen held abroad.115 The prosecutor who dismisses the
charges against a foreign defendant has not violated the fiduciary duty
to do justice because the deal, which furthers the extrinsic interest in
foreign relations, does not result in an injustice. After all, many guilty
individuals go free for a myriad of reasons in our system. On the other
hand, if a prosecutor were to pursue an innocent foreign individual in
order to gain a foreign policy advantage for the United States, that
would be a breach of fiduciary duty because the prosecutor will have
prioritized an extrinsic consideration that resulted in the prosecution
of an innocent individual.116
Of course, there are some considerations that might fall on the
margin. For instance, are reducing mass incarceration and racial injustice
in prosecution intrinsic or extrinsic concerns? It is possible that they are
both. Overincarceration burdens taxpayers and potentially disrupts

114. See Green, supra note 65, at 1204–05 (arguing that, as public officials,
“[p]rosecutors can and should take account of a broad range of social policy
considerations that bear on their work” and not just those implicating traditional
criminal justice concerns such as proportionality).
115. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 1834.
116. Id.
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communities, which makes it seem an important extrinsic concern. But
the length of incarceration also informs questions of deterrence and
incapacitation, which are at the core of criminal justice. Similarly, racial
injustice and bias may be questions that bear on communities as a whole
and race relations, which sound like extrinsic concerns. But they may also
bear on fairness and proportionality, which are central to pursuing
justice in an individual case.
In sum, enforcing loyalty is difficult where the beneficiary to whom
prosecutors owe loyalty is so amorphous; the objectives that prosecutors
must pursue on their beneficiary’s behalf are so vague; and prosecutors
have so much discretion to discern the relevant objectives, balance them,
and decide how best to pursue them. Like other public officials,
prosecutors typically make discretionary decisions by engaging in a
complicated balancing of competing public interests. The interests of
particular segments of the public may not reflect the best interest of
the public in general. Because prosecutors’ decision-making process is
not transparent, it may be impossible to discern whether prosecutors
are privileging the interests of a vocal majority or even narrower
parochial interests. And, particularly in the case of elected prosecutors,
prosecutorial self-interest may dovetail with the interests of powerful
political factions. The law neither prescribes prosecutors’ discretionary
decision-making criteria in general nor excludes considering or even
privileging particular factions’ interests and preferences; nor does the
law prescribe a process for making discretionary decisions that reduces
the risk that particular public interests will be overvalued. The limited
ability of existing law and legal institutions to ensure prosecutors’ duty
of loyalty, especially in the face of public pressure, underscores the
importance of alternative means of prosecutorial accountability.
C. Developing Affirmative Theories of Care and Loyalty
To a large extent, fiduciary theory is concerned with avoiding
opportunism on the part of the fiduciary. It identifies abusive conduct—
violations of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty—and mechanisms to
identify, redress, and deter such bad conduct.117 But does the theory offer
anything positive—an affirmative vision of good conduct? We assume that
the duties of care and loyalty entail more than avoiding negligence and

117. Galoob & Leib, supra note 1, at 117–18.
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betrayal.118 Any illumination would be valuable because the law and
legal processes are so deficient. Rules of professional conduct offer
virtually no guidance to prosecutors about what it means to make good
decisions.119 Existing professional accountability mechanisms, such as
professional discipline and judicial sanctions, are directed at
punishing the very worst conduct, not defining good conduct, and, in
any event, they have little to say about prosecutorial discretion.
In the case of private clients, lawyers largely accept their clients’
stated objectives, try to accomplish them, and defer to at least certain
decisions regarding how to do so. But prosecutors do not take
direction. No one would suggest that prosecutors should take a public
referendum on whether particular individuals should be prosecuted
or on the terms of a proposed plea bargain. Fiduciary theory of
governance helps focus the question not on whether the prosecutor has
been loyal to a particular set of people but rather to a public purpose,
here, the duty to seek justice in criminal cases. But the problem remains
how to give such a vague notion a concrete meaning, other than what
any individual prosecutor believes is just.
In determining the meaning of the prosecutor’s mandate, should
the public—the beneficiary of a prosecutor’s work as fiduciary—have
any voice at all in prosecutors’ decisions beyond, in the case of elected
prosecutors, deciding which prosecutor makes those decisions?
Obviously, the public has no direct voice; the prosecutor acts as its
decision-making surrogate. But in making decisions, must prosecutors
look for a way to discern, and give weight to, popular demands?
Some have suggested that prosecutors should defer to, or at least take
account of, public preferences regarding decisions in individual cases.120
This, however, misconstrues prosecutors’ job. While prosecutors’ duty to
“seek justice” is a vague concept, it decidedly does not mean carrying out

118. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 736 (“Although the duty [of care] seemingly
requires little more than avoiding negligence, most concede that it entails affirmative
obligations (unlike the mostly prohibitive duty of loyalty) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
119. On the limited reach of prosecutorial ethics rules, particularly with regard to
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions, see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–91 (explaining that the only exercise of discretion
pretrial or during trial that the prosecutorial ethics rules addresses is whether to
initiate a criminal charge, with respect to which the prosecutorial ethics rule requires
only “probable cause”).
120. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV.
69, 71 (2011) (“Because prosecutors act on the public’s behalf, their decisions should
reflect their constituents’ preferences.”).
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the public’s will in each individual case. On the contrary, seeking justice
presupposes that prosecutors stand as a bulwark against mob justice and
avoid making decisions based on the public’s (or their own) passions and
prejudices.121 Prosecutors are supposed to make discretionary decisions in
individual cases in accordance with the law and with norms and traditions
that are relatively constant over time and that reflect generally applicable
law enforcement considerations and principles (such as proportionality
and equal treatment).122 For example, prosecutors have a duty to avoid
convicting innocent people, which may require declining to bring charges
in light of their own professional doubts about an individual’s guilt, even if
the public is clamoring for a prosecution.123 This is not to say that
prosecutors may disregard public preferences; it is simply to say that the
public preferences that prosecutors implement are principally those
discernable in the Constitution, other laws, and legal traditions, including
the norms and traditions governing criminal prosecution.124
Particularly hard questions of prosecutorial discretion are presented
when the cross-cutting principles governing criminal prosecution intersect
with questions of social policy. The public may have a reasonable claim that,
121. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (“[W]hatever else prosecutors
do, they should act nonpolitically. This encompasses both avoiding obligations to the
political parties with which they are affiliated . . . and holding themselves above public
outcry and frenzy about particular cases. The latter principle derives from society’s
aversion to mob justice.” (footnotes omitted)); David Alan Sklansky, The Changing
Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 673 (2017) (“The
danger of politicizing the handling of particular cases is, in fact, a worrisome aspect of
the growing attention voters seem to be paying to prosecutorial elections.”).
122. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (“A nonpolitical prosecutor
arguably can ignore the public’s desires concerning a specific case at a heated moment
of time while remaining true to the public will in a more general sense. In other words,
the nonpolitical prosecutor will ignore a momentary hue and cry but continue to heed
public expectations as they are expressed over time in the law and popular culture.”
(footnote omitted)).
123. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 79
(2010) (the prevailing view is “that an ethical prosecutor should pursue criminal charges
against a defendant only if the prosecutor personally believes that the defendant is guilty”);
Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion,
20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993) (arguing that prosecutors must be “morally certain”
of the defendant’s guilt before pursuing charges).
124. Here, the beneficiary’s objective is a public purpose, but one that is not
expressed in a particular law that a public official is entrusted with implementing, but
one that acquires meaning over time. It is embodied in criminal law and procedure,
combined with decades of spoken, written, and accepted norms of practice that help
define the beneficial purpose. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 570 (explaining that
fiduciaries can serve an abstract public purpose).
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at least as to social policy, its preferences should carry the day. Take, for
example, the question of whether an urban prosecutor should prosecute
individuals for quality-of-life offenses, such as defacing buildings with
graffiti, smoking marijuana in public, or fare-beating.125 A prosecutor has a
range of options. At one extreme, the prosecutor might almost entirely
ignore certain offenses, making a judgment, for example, never to
prosecute fare-beating cases, as Manhattan’s District Attorney did
recently.126 At the other extreme, the prosecutor might decide to
prosecute these cases aggressively based, for example, on the empirically
questionable “broken windows” theory that ignoring quality-of-life
offenses inevitably leads to more serious offenses.127 Or, taking an
intermediate approach, a prosecutor might bring quality-of-life offenders
to a community court or other problem-solving court in which some
alternative to incarceration is available.128 To the extent that the choice
turns on social policy judgments, do public preferences carry weight?
No one would expect the public to have the last word on whether any
particular arrested individual should be prosecuted for a quality-of-life
offense (or any other offense) because that determination rests in part on
matters of evidentiary fact and criminal justice principles that are uniquely

125. This is a question on which New York City prosecutors have disagreed and taken
different approaches over time. See Shawn Cohen et al., Manhattan DA Won’t Prosecute
Quality-of-Life
Offenses
Anymore,
N.Y.
POST
(Mar.
1,
2016),
https://nypost.com/2016/03/01/manhattan-da-wont-prosecute-quality-of-life-offensesanymore [https://perma.cc/8XGW-5MZ7].
126. Brendan Cheney, Manhattan DA Will No Longer Prosecute Turnstile Jumping,
POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2018/02/01/manhattan-da-will-no-longer-prosecute-turnstile-jumping-229568
[https://perma.cc/PG7P-NXKH]. For a discussion of the separation of powers issues
involved in this sort of decision, see Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, at 9
(2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479165 (arguing that
declining to prosecute entire classes of cases is a proper check on legislatures).
127. See Michelle Chen, Want to See How Biased Broken Windows Policing Is? Spend a
Day in Court, THE NATION (May 17, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/wantto-see-how-biased-broken-windows-policing-is-spend-a-day-in-court [https://perma.cc
/M5HP-SAUS]; see also WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, BROKEN WINDOWS AND
QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 3, 5 (2015), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZB6-DJNP].
128. See Andrew Denney, After 25 Years, NYC’s Midtown Community Court Still Takes
‘Problem-Solving’ Approach to Low-Level Crime, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/after-25-years-nycs-midtowncommunity-court-still-takes-problem-solving-approach-to-low-level-crime
[https://perma.cc/P5FL-MGGP].
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within the prosecutor’s expertise, such as whether there is sufficient
evidence of guilt and whether the particular defendant is so culpable or
dangerous relative to others who commit the offense as to deserve or
necessitate punishment.129 These are criminal justice questions that
prosecutors conventionally resolve based on the relevant evidence and
their understanding of the principles governing prosecutors’ work.
Likewise, the general question of how to allocate resources as between, say,
graffiti cases and arson cases, is one that prosecutors would conventionally
resolve based on considerations intrinsic to the law.130 The conventional
understanding that arson is the more serious wrong, as reflected in the
legislative sentencing scheme, would lead a prosecutor to prioritize
arson cases. And questions of how to allocate limited prosecutorial
resources also reflect an administrative judgment that is ordinarily
entrusted to prosecutors.
But, at the core, there is also a criminal justice policy question on
which prosecutors might disagree and as to which the public might
have a view. The criminalization of quality-of-life offenses reflects a
legislative judgment that the public interest is at least sometimes served
by prosecuting low-level offenders.131 Members of the community may
take the view that, to promote public safety, these offenders should be
prosecuted as a matter of course. Conversely, the public may take the
view that prosecuting these offenders undermines relationships
between the law enforcement officials and communities and is
excessively disruptive.132 Underlying the policy question may be
empirical questions, such as whether the prosecution of quality-of-life
offenses leads to the discovery of, or deters, more serious crimes.
Does prosecutors’ overarching duty to pursue justice in the abstract
mean that prosecutors should resolve public policy questions
themselves without regard to public preferences? If not, to what extent
should prosecutors defer to the public’s preferences regarding policy
questions such as this? Suppose, for example, that there is a clear
public demand to prosecute quality-of-life offenses aggressively in
order to deter more serious crimes. Does loyalty to the public
presuppose that the prosecutor defer to that demand, even if the
prosecutor’s own judgment is that the public’s preference is founded

129.
130.
131.
132.

See Green, supra note 65, at 1196–97.
See Bratton, supra note 127, at 6–7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
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on an empirical misunderstanding or that the public interest is better
served by a less aggressive prosecutorial approach?
An elected prosecutor may run on a criminal justice policy platform
and fairly claim that, once elected, it is within the prosecutor’s authority
to determine and implement criminal justice policy within the area of
discretion afforded by the legislature. In other words, the point of the
election is to decide who has the better judgment regarding policy and
to elect the lawyer who can be trusted with responsibility for best
resolving questions of policy. But that would mean that, once elected,
the prosecutor can essentially ignore public preferences (except to the
extent useful to win reelection). It is unclear why an elected prosecutor
would have a stronger claim than other elected officials to set policy
without regard to the public will.
The problem is not entirely avoided by appointed prosecutors. In
federal cases, it may be assumed that United States Attorneys defer to
the policy preferences of the appointed Attorney General and,
indirectly, those of the President.133 But many policy questions may be
unanswered or unresolved at higher levels, leaving the question
whether United States Attorneys may interpose their own policy
preferences or must discern and implement those of the public.134
If elected prosecutors may not decide policy questions entirely on
the basis of their own best professional judgment, but must defer, or
give weight, to public preferences regarding broad questions of
criminal justice policy, how is the relevant policy to be discerned? The
public cannot be polled. Public preferences cannot necessarily be
inferred from existing legislation or even vocal social movements.
Arguably, some other elected representative—a governor or mayor—
may speak for the public. But it is hard to see why another elected
official would be better able than the elected prosecutor to discern the
public will regarding criminal justice policy questions.
If the prosecutor must discern the public will, another question
remains, namely, which public? If, as we assume, the prosecutor’s client
is the public, what do we mean by that? Does a United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York have a special obligation to the

133. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s
Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 387, 467 (2017); Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017).
134. See generally Leslie B. Arffa, Note, Separation of Prosecutors, 128 YALE L.J. 1078, 1103
(2019) (describing and justifying the decentralization of federal criminal prosecution).

842

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:805

population of New York or owe obligations to citizens of the United
States?135 Would a local prosecutor owe obligations to all citizens in the
State? Or only to those citizens in the local prosecutor’s district? Assuming
the answer is the former, should the prosecutor assess the interests of the
State with a special eye toward the needs of the local community?
Further, efforts to discern the will of the public may be in tension with
the previously discussed principle that prosecutors may not serve the
interests of private subgroups. If the prosecutor implements the policy
judgments of the particular political party of which the prosecutor is a
member, one might consider that the prosecutor is acting in an
impermissibly partisan fashion, promoting the interests of a political
party—a private group—at the expense of the general public. Or one
might say that the prosecutor is giving impermissible priority to the
preferences of a subgroup, not necessarily carrying out the will of the
public at large. Of course, no resolution of a policy question will ever
reflect the preference of every member of the public. But arguably, the
general preference to which a prosecutor must defer is not that of the
prosecutor’s party.136

135. For example, in deciding whether to prosecute an obscenity charge, should a
federal prosecutor be concerned about the social norms of the federal district (which
would be the relevant ones for determining whether material is obscene under the
federal criminal law) or the social norms of the broader national population? Cf.
Freedberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 703 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D.D.C. 1988) (enjoining
federal obscenity prosecutions in multiple federal districts, notwithstanding that states
may apply different obscenity standards). In general, the popular norms that restrain
and influence prosecutors are likely those of the population served, from which jurors
are chosen, if only for the instrumental reason that those are the norms on which a
jury is likely to draw. See generally Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 1071, 1105–06 (2019) (describing empirical findings that federal
prosecutors make discretionary decisions with an eye toward how they believe a jury
would perceive the case).
136. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (discussing ideal of prosecutorial
nonpartisanship). Needless to say, prosecutors have not always comported with this
understanding. Both elected and appointed prosecutors may be heavily engaged in partisan
politics and beholden to political parties for their positions. See Michael J. Ellis, Note, The
Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1565–67 (2012); cf. Scott Ingram, George
Washington’s Attorneys: The Political Selection of United States Attorneys at the Founding, 39 PACE L.
REV. 163, 164–65 (2018). At least before the prevalence of contemporary understandings
regarding prosecutors’ obligation to be impartial and not politically partisan, prosecutors who
were beholden to a political party were more likely to accede to its influence when making
discretionary decisions. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1338–39 (2002) (describing influence of the
Tammany Hall political machine on late nineteenth century prosecutors in New York City).
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Finally, assuming that loyalty to the public requires deference to the
public’s discernable policy preferences, the question remains how to
make discretionary decisions that give appropriate weight to those
policy preferences along with the considerations that are properly
within the prosecutor’s bailiwick. For example, a prosecutor adopting
a “tough on crime” approach in deference to public demand would
still be expected to weed out cases where the evidence is too weak to
justify prosecution. The prosecutor might still be expected to treat
certain defendants leniently in light of mitigating considerations that
suggest that the offense was aberrant or understandable. The
prosecutor might still prioritize the prosecution of more serious
crimes, given resource limitations.
All of these questions pose a challenge to the idea of prosecutorial
accountability, to which we will return. If prosecutors owe the public
duties of care and loyalty, there presumably must be some process to
hold prosecutors accountable. But the ambiguity regarding the scope
of prosecutors’ obligations poses an obstacle. What does it mean for a
prosecutor to make careful discretionary decisions or to be loyal to the
public, in the affirmative sense; what does it mean to be faithful to the
public interest or to carry out the public purpose competently in a
criminal case? The complexity and opacity of prosecutors’ decision
making as well as the amount of independence that prosecutors must
necessarily exercise make it difficult to determine whether prosecutors
are acting carefully and faithfully or even to know what faithful
execution of the criminal law entails in any given situation.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY VS. INDEPENDENCE
This Part argues that while accountability and independence seem
at odds, they are, in truth, two alternate ways to best define the
beneficiary’s interest and ensure that the prosecutor remains loyal to
that interest.137 Prosecutors need to give meaning to the vague
mandate to do justice. Other public fiduciaries like agency heads may
be able to look to statutes or bylaws to assess the purpose or goal they
serve and give it more concrete meaning.138 Prosecutors have no such

137. For an argument that prosecutorial independence is at odds with
accountability, see Davis, supra note 4, at 438–48.
138. See Criddle, supra note 2, at 151–52 (explaining that “administrative agencies
owe fiduciary duties to their statutory beneficiaries” in executing their “statutorily
defined missions”).
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framework. The structure of the office, created in part by the system of
accountability and independence itself, must over time serve that role.
Accountability demands consequences when prosecutors fail to
pursue the public interest. It assumes an institutional mechanism for
monitoring prosecutors. Independence, on the other hand, ensures
that prosecutors can use their experience and expertise to assess the
public interest and determine how best to achieve it without caving in
to political influence or mob pressure.139 Independence requires some
insulation from elected officials and the public. The challenge is to
maximize accountability without jeopardizing independence.
Accountability can have any of several different, if inter-related,
meanings. At a minimum, accountability suggests meeting one’s
responsibilities—that is, doing what one is supposed to do in the way
in which one is supposed to do it. Accountability may also mean
justifying what one does,140 and facing consequences when failing to
fulfil one’s responsibilities. Prosecutors can be held accountable in
different ways. The lay public can exercise direct control over
prosecutorial decisions or could have a more robust role in how those
decisions are made. A prosecutor can be subject either to direct
political consequences for his or her work, or the political official who
appointed the prosecutor can face repercussions for the prosecutor’s
conduct. Alternatively, accountability can require processes for
reaching decisions. Prosecutors can be subject to internal and external
mechanisms of review and resulting sanctions. Finally, all these forms
of accountability may require varying degrees of transparency.
Transparency in prosecutors’ decision making is complicated because
much of what prosecutors do requires secrecy.
Prosecutorial independence, on the other hand, assumes that
experience and expertise are the best guarantee that prosecutors will
seek the public interest. Professional reputation, legacy, and self-image

139. See Davis, supra note 4, at 438 (“[P]rosecutors require a certain level of
independence to make their decisions without inappropriate and extraneous political
pressures.”); Richman, supra note 4, at 957–59 (discussing the view that “insulation
from narrow interest groups and corrupt influences” allows prosecutors to effectively
“divine the public interest”).
140. See Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L.
REV. 999, 1018 (2009) (“Psychologists who study accountability define it broadly as the
experience of feeling pressure to justify judgments or decisions to others. Under the
right conditions, imposing accountability on decision makers can make them more
thorough and objective.” (footnote omitted)).
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will ensure that prosecutors adhere to their obligations of duty and
care. Any intrusion into their work threatens the purity of the exercise.
Lawyers’ independence was originally conceived in republican terms.
Lawyers, as part of an aristocracy, were uniquely suited to guard liberty
by ensuring the good of all citizens.141 Their wealth made them
independent of any faction, immune to the kind of domination that
might distract them from this duty, or in Rave’s terms, trigger the
“tyranny of the majority” problem.142 Initially, only a small class of
aristocrats were thought to possess the necessary virtue to fulfill this
role.143 As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a burgeoning middle
class based its claim to this special status on merit, skill, and training,
as opposed to aristocratic pedigree. Lawyers were seen as a separate
estate that stood poised to protect against an arbitrary exercise of power
by the State and the dominion of one man or one group over another.144
Fiduciary theorists have also traced fiduciary law to republican theory.145
While many have been justifiably skeptical about this rhetoric, it can
be useful.146 At least some prosecutors, like many other lawyers and
public officials, take pride in what they do and want to do it well.
Additionally, they are trained in certain practices that are, at least

141. See Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193,
203–04 (2015) (describing the historical view that lawyers—who, according to Alexis
de Tocqueville, “constituted an American brand of aristocracy”—had “sufficient
means to think beyond [their] own self-interest”).
142. Rave, supra note 87, at 54–61; see Roiphe, supra note 141, at 203–05
(summarizing the theory that only those with means to “provide for [their] own basic
material needs” could exercise the independence required to be a lawyer).”
143. Id. at 205.
144. See id. at 206 (describing the belief that lawyers’ education and training
uniquely positioned them to act for the good of all).
145. See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95
TEX. L. REV. 993, 994–1000 (2017) (arguing that republican theory is the best way to
interpret fiduciary law).
146. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 650–
53 (2016) (suggesting that “aspects of the older understanding of professionalism,” which
have generated skepticism among lawyers and scholars, “can and should be relevant and
vital today”). Attorney General William Barr, when testifying before the Senate as a
nominee for the position, used this notion of professionalism and accountability to the
American people to explain why he was suited for the job. Hearing on the Nomination of the
Honorable William Pelham Barr to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 116 Cong. 1–2 (2019) (written testimony of William P. Barr),
https://judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barr%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YHE2-KFDS].
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theoretically, designed to ensure justice in particular cases.147 This
training allows them to draw on their experience, knowledge, and skill
to exercise judgment in ways that avoid miscarriages of justice,
distortions, and abuse. Even when an individual prosecutor may lack
the judgment we would like and expect, that prosecutor is constrained
by, and often invested in, the procedures and traditions of the office
that create a real check on the prosecutor’s conduct.
The dangers to the beneficiary are significant when prosecutors are
not held accountable for their acts. Social movements, like the
innocence movement and Black Lives Matter, have highlighted just
how vulnerable communities are to prosecutorial abuse.148 Some have
even pointed to independence as the problem.149 But fiduciary theory
helps explain why eroding prosecutorial independence has its own
potential perils. If we are not vigilant, partisan political groups or
powerful private individuals or groups might seek to use prosecutors
to advance their own personal or political interests at the expense of
the broader public mandate. Organized factions within the public might
try to influence or even take over prosecutors’ offices for their own ends.
Those without an understanding of the criminal justice system might seek
results that are not in keeping with all the rules and procedures designed
to ensure justice. Vulnerable groups or unpopular defendants might
suffer at the hands of a majority that does not fully grasp the need for
processes and protections. There is a risk not only to individuals who
may be wrongly pursued for a political pay-off but also to unpopular
defendants, who may face a kind of mob justice.150 The rule of law
requires not only accountability but independence.
Fiduciary theory offers a way to balance these competing concerns.
If a prosecutor’s fiduciary obligation is to pursue the public’s abstract
interest in justice, then prosecutors need some degree of insulation to
weigh those central concerns. The public should not have a direct or

147. See Timothy Fry, Prosecutorial Training Wheels: Ginsburg’s Connick v. Thompson
Dissent and the Training Imperative, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1275, 1277–78 (2012)
(explaining that while the Court noted in Connick v. Thompson that “[i]ndividual
prosecutors have received ‘professional training and have ethical obligations’” related
to the fair administration of justice, the dissent viewed this training as more theoretical
than practically effective).
148. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 13, at 89–90, 93–95.
149. See Davis, supra note 4, at 408–15 (describing prosecutors’ wide discretion to
make outcome-determinative decisions, like charging, and the limited mechanisms for
monitoring potential abuses of such discretion).
150. Green & Roiphe, Punishment Without Process, supra note 17.
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even indirect ability to control how prosecutors weigh concerns like
fairness, proportionality, deterrence, and retribution. Those concerns,
which are central to the prosecutors’ fiduciary mission, ought to be
evaluated both in light of the office’s prior decisions in similar cases
and in the context of the facts of that particular case. The public is illequipped to make this sort of evaluation. On the other hand, when a
prosecutor considers extrinsic concerns that are not central to the core
criminal justice mission, there is more room for public input, either
directly or through another elected official. The extent to which
prosecutors should serve social justice or take into account the
economic disadvantage of the accused, potential foreign policy, or
immigration repercussions, are all questions of broad social policy that
may be relevant in any given prosecution but are not central to the
prosecutor’s fiduciary mandate. Other actors may well be better
situated than the prosecutor to assess the public’s interest with regard
to those extrinsic concerns.
This Part will proceed by identifying each mechanism of accountability
and analyzing the risks they pose to prosecutorial independence. This, in
turn, provides a framework for assessing which mechanisms of
accountability will work best to align the prosecutor’s interest with that of
the public without making too great a sacrifice to prosecutorial
independence. This Part then returns to fiduciary theory, arguing that
the unique nature of prosecutors’ role offers new insight into the
fiduciary theory of governance.
A. Mechanisms of Accountability
1.

External control over prosecutors
Some scholars, particularly those who lament the decline in the role
of the jury trial, have suggested greater lay control over prosecutorial
decision making. Stephanos Bibas has argued that juries should review
plea bargain sentence recommendations.151 Josh Bowers and Jocelyn
Simonson have similarly suggested greater lay participation in the
151. Stephanos Bibas, Observers as Participants: Letting the Public Monitor the Criminal Justice
Bureaucracy, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 342, 342–44 (2014) (advocating for public participation in
plea hearings); Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 961 (2006) (“[P]lea and sentencing juries would serve many of the
functions that grand and petit juries once did, checking executive and judicial conduct.”);
see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient
Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 356, 358 (2010) (arguing for grand jury
supervision over plea bargaining and sentencing decisions).
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criminal justice system.152 These scholars argue that the rise in plea
bargaining and the decline in jury trials account for some of the
harshness of the current system.153
Some of these proposals may be wise, particularly those that seek to
educate members of the public about the way the criminal justice
system works so that they can exercise their rights to alter and reform
the system when it has gone awry.154 Involving the lay public directly in
prosecutorial decision making is more problematic, at least where
those decisions involve the core interests intrinsic to justice. Doing so
risks undermining prosecutorial independence by allowing the
influence of those who may lack a commitment to the processes and
traditions of the office and who certainly lack the information to make
appropriate decisions. While lay input might arguably mitigate an
unjustifiably harsh system, public influence may also threaten greater
harshness toward unpopular defendants.
There may be a greater role for the public to play either directly or
indirectly through elected officials in determining which extrinsic
values ought to bear on prosecutors’ decisions. So, prosecutors ought to
be more responsive to public concerns and public opinion about
immigration or foreign policy, both of which are at least to some degree
extrinsic to a determination of what is just in any individual case.
Holding public fiduciaries responsible for their actions is necessarily
difficult and imperfect. The imperfect mechanisms for holding
fiduciaries responsible are justified by trust. Fiduciary models rely, in
part, on the idea that the fiduciary has the character to resist

152. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657–62 (2010) (arguing for lay input into charging
decisions); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2173, 2176–77 (2014) (arguing that the Constitution embodies “the idea that the
function of the public in the criminal courtroom goes beyond the protection of individuals
to implicate the ability of citizens to . . . hold the criminal justice system accountable”).
153. Cf. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
359, 387, 399 (2005) (arguing that “[i]nvolving local laypeople in charging and
sentencing decisions would . . . reverse the current trend toward ever-harsher
policies,” and specifically that “in a world of guilty pleas, the grand jury as focus group
or judicial body may be the only mechanism to ensure that charging policies do not
deviate too much from local community opinion”).
154. See Simonson, supra note 152, at 2174–78 (emphasizing the importance of the
public audience in courtrooms for “hold[ing] the criminal justice system
accountable”).
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temptation and abide by the beneficiary’s interest.155 Theorists suggest
that when the beneficiary is particularly vulnerable, the law should
recognize residual control rights to ensure that the agent does not
betray the principal.156 The public is quite vulnerable to discretionary
decisions made by prosecutors, but it is difficult to give control over
prosecutors directly to the public in part because the beneficiary’s
interest is an abstraction rather than a particular individual or group
with a defined interest.157 Any control exercised indirectly by the
legislature or executive risks undermining prosecutorial independence.
That leaves us with the need to devise creative ways to hold prosecutors
accountable that will not simultaneously undermine independence,
thereby risking other distortions of their duty of loyalty.
Others suggest that legislatures, courts, or disciplinary authorities ought
to exercise control over prosecutors’ decisions.158 These mechanisms have
proved ineffective. Legislatures are incapable of taking into account the
kind of specific facts and circumstances necessary to constrain
prosecutors’ decisions, and courts are limited both by separation of
powers concerns and by their capacity to review the fact-specific
decisions in individual cases. Disciplinary authorities are limited because
the directly punitive structure is best suited to intentional misconduct.
2.

Political accountability
Some argue that the best way to ensure that prosecutors pursue
socially beneficial ends is to hold them politically accountable for their
acts.159 Perhaps the most prominent proponent of political
155. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706–07 (identifying the beneficiary’s trust in the
fiduciary as one of three indicia of the fiduciary relationship).
156. Cf. id. at 707–08 (“[W]here residual control rights are particularly weak, the
beneficiary’s vulnerability to predation is greater and, therefore, the fiduciary must
meet a higher standard of conduct.” (footnote omitted)).
157. Cf. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 523–24 (explaining that some fiduciary
mandates “are not identified with determinate persons and their practical interests;
they are, in this sense, abstract”).
158. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 180–82, 189 (2007) (arguing for more rigorous bar disciplinary processes
for prosecutors and prosecutorial reform legislation as necessary); Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV.
693, 733–36 (1987) (proposing changes in bar disciplinary proceedings); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1568–72 (1981)
(calling for more robust judicial review of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions).
159. See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., PROSECUTORS, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE: HOLDING
PROSECUTORS ACCOUNTABLE 6–10 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5c4fbee5697a9849dae88a23/t/5d6d8d224f45fb00014076d5/1567460643414/Prosec
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accountability for prosecutors is Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison
v. Olson.160 In arguing for the unconstitutionality of the special
prosecutor under the Ethics in Government Act, Scalia complained
that by insulating the role from presidential control, the legislature
had essentially ensured that no political actor could be held
accountable for the special prosecutor’s acts.161
As Professor Dan Epps has asked, “why is the right goal letting
politically accountable prosecutors follow the political winds?”162 A
prosecutor attuned to the political majority might well do the right
thing. The prosecutor might, for instance, decline to prosecute a
technically guilty individual who is not morally blameworthy. But at the
same time, a political majority might be particularly bloodthirsty,
especially in a case that has had an immediate impact on the
community. A political majority might unfairly target a particular
group or demand a conviction when a prosecutor thinks the evidence
is lacking. In addition, we have long abandoned the notion that
political actors always pursue socially useful ends. Powerful interests
can capture the political process: even if following the majority’s will
would lead the prosecutor to do the right thing, political calculations
often lead elected officials to follow a powerful minority’s interest
rather than that of the majority.
The public is often only interested in a select group of cases—the
most gruesome crimes or those involving celebrities or other popular
causes. This, too, threatens to warp a prosecutor’s ability to respond to
the more abstract public purpose. Prosecutors, who are directly
responsive to the public, may have little incentive to follow the will of

utors%2C+Democracy%2C+Justice_FORMATTED+9.2.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/ Q28BJS9W] (suggesting that the public can hold prosecutors accountable by electing
prosecutors who are truthful, transparent, and equitable); Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the
Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 391–413 (2009) (arguing
that United States Attorneys lack the political accountability of local prosecutors). But see
David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in the United
States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 276, 277 (Máximo
Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) (discussing the widely-shared view that “[t]he
last thing we should want from prosecutors is ‘democratic accountability’”).
160. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
161. See id. at 728–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if it were entirely evident that
unfairness was in fact the result [of the work of an independent counsel] . . . there would
be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could be assigned.”).
162. See Epps, supra note 44, at 848; see also Richman, supra note 4, at 973–74 (arguing
that electoral control is far less likely to force prosecutors to be responsive to the community
than if prosecutors are encouraged to decide cases in the shadow of jury decisions).
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the public if no one cares. Even if citizens do care, the public would
have a hard time assessing a prosecutor’s job, at least when it comes to
the obligation to weigh intrinsic criminal justice concerns, given that
cases hinge on facts and law that are hard to assess.163 A few cases then
could work as cover for the rest. Even if the public could be made to
care about all cases equally, voters are not in a good position to assess
the prosecutors’ discretionary choices in more complex, factually or
legally complicated cases. As we discussed above, it is not clear whether
a local prosecutor owes loyalty to members of the district in which the
prosecutor works, to the state as a whole, or to the United States.164 If
it is the latter, elections of local or state prosecutors will not work to
align her interest with that of the beneficiary.165
Despite Justice Scalia’s assertions in Morrison, federal prosecutors are
even less accountable than state prosecutors. United States Attorneys
are appointed by the President,166 often with input from local
legislators. They have little incentive to serve local communities, and it
is unlikely that the President would be held responsible for something
that happened in one of the ninety-four federal districts. Theoretically,
the Attorney General would be held responsible, and this, in turn, would
reflect on the President, but that seems unlikely at best.167 Local
prosecutors may be more responsive to the public, but pathologies in local
politics render this solution problematic. Most district attorneys run
uncontested, and the voting public pays little attention to the campaigns.
Not only is political accountability ineffective, it can also be
dangerous in its threat to prosecutorial independence. The greater the
hierarchical control of prosecutors either by a political actor or by the
voting public, the greater the danger that decisions that ought to be
characterized by the disinterested application of law to facts will
instead reflect the partisan preference of certain groups.168 Political
163. Cf. Richman, supra note 4, at 965 (“[T]he bulk of the discretionary decisions
that prosecutors make turn . . . [on] case-specific factors. Electoral or appointive
politics are, at best, a poor way of holding prosecutors accountable for this myriad of
low-visibility enforcement decisions.”).
164. See supra Section II.C.
165. Others have noted the difficulty in identifying the relevant principal. See Ethan J.
Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 94 (2013).
166. Beale, supra note 159, at 370.
167. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
543 (2001) (“United States Attorneys’ offices . . . have the power to set their own agendas,
to decide what cases they wish to spend time on and what cases they wish to ignore.”).
168. Cf. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 72 (“[C]onflicts of interest threaten to
undermine [prosecutors’] impartial decision-making . . . . Allocating responsibility for
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accountability may have a role to play in aligning the interest of the
public with its principal, but it cannot serve as a panacea. Political
accountability works better where the question is prosecutorial policy
as opposed to effectiveness. It works better when it concerns policies
extrinsic to the central fiduciary mission of the prosecutor. A local
prosecutor and a federal prosecutor may well be held responsible for
implementing policy promises. As we discussed above, the public may
prefer or disfavor a broken windows approach to prosecution and is in
a fairly good position to assess the prosecutor’s position.169 As we have
argued elsewhere, and in part because of the question of
accountability, the President has a role to play in setting federal
prosecutors’ policy agendas but not in controlling individual cases.170
3.

Internal processes and structures for decision making
A different mechanism to ensure accountability requires internal
processes for decision making. Many scholars have suggested reforming
prosecutors’ offices to better align their actions with the public interest.
Even if the substance of public interest is elusive, it is easier to agree on
processes designed to approximate it. If public officers are fiduciaries, then
their actions must be made on behalf of the public. Processes are important
and at times critical to ensure that this is the case.171
We have argued elsewhere that deliberation among differently
situated prosecutors, the recording of decision-making processes, and
internal review of these processes can help reduce prosecutorial conflicts
of interest.172 Others have, in different contexts, proposed changes in
institutional design to counter implicit bias and other distortions in
prosecutors’ judgment.173 Prosecutors should, at the very least, consciously
weigh different factors in making important decisions about the public
interest and the meaning of the broad mandate to serve justice. While
people may not agree about which factors ought to take precedence over

decisions in individual cases to career prosecutors who are lower down in the hierarchy
helps achieve the fair and disinterested administration of criminal justice by making
these sorts of conflicts less likely.”).
169. Supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
170. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 6.
171. Cf. EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 103–04 (2016) (exploring how nondomination and a fiduciary theory of international norms protect individuals subject
to public power against abuse).
172. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 525–27.
173. See Barkow, supra note 3, at 883, 887–88.
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others in any given decision, all can agree that prosecutors should
consider only proper factors and make a deliberate decision about how
to weigh them given the facts of the case.
Extrapolating from the private law theory, Ethan Leib and Stephen
Galoob argue that all fiduciary relationships are characterized by a respect
for the principal and therefore involve a commitment to deliberation,
conscientiousness, and robustness. Deliberation involves not just a
particular outcome but a process for arriving at that outcome. Leib and
Galoob claim that fiduciaries must maintain a continued commitment to
a decision-making process. To be conscientious, a fiduciary must act for
the right reasons, namely, to help realize and pursue the interest of the
beneficiary. Finally, robustness requires that this process of conscientious
deliberation be continuous and account for new information.174
Prosecutors could be required to engage in this sort of conscientious
deliberative process. They could be encouraged through structural
change within offices to account for new information and consciously and
explicitly engage with prior practices within the office.175
These sorts of reforms are promising in part because they pose little
threat to, and possibly foster, prosecutorial independence. Encouraging
internal processes and structural change offers a way to help ensure that
prosecutors adhere to certain traditions and thought processes that work
to align their discretionary decisions with the public interest. Among other
things, the problem with these sorts of internal controls is that there are few
guarantees that prosecutors will adhere to them and that if they do, they
will do so seriously. Those who are concerned that prosecutors, left to their
own devices, are not good at monitoring their own behavior may be
skeptical that these sorts of changes will really help align prosecutors’
decisions with the public interest.
174. See Ethan Leib & Stephen Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE
L.J. 1820, 1839 (2016). While Leib and Galoob’s theory is controversial, we do not plan
to wade into this argument because we are using their contribution as well as that of
others as a means of exploring prosecutors’ obligations. Since we are doing so in the
spirit of analogy as a pragmatic endeavor rather than applying it in a literal fashion, all
aspects of the theory can be useful. Some critics of Leib and Galoob argue that this
elaboration of fiduciary duty mistakes a moral conception of loyalty for a fiduciary one.
Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
180–81 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds., 2018). While we do not take a side
in the debate about with whether or not the deliberative norms Leib and Galoob
identify are a necessary feature of all fiduciary relationships or a common feature of
some, we do draw on the observation that for prosecutorial decision making, the duty
of loyalty requires certain deliberative processes.
175. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 525–33.
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4.

Transparency
Transparency can work in conjunction with these other forms of
accountability to ensure a more direct kind of control for the
beneficiary. Linked to progressive politics, transparency is thought to be
necessary to promote democratic goals, efficiency, and egalitarianism.176
An electorate cannot hope to hold a public official accountable without a
clear understanding of how well that official’s job has been done. If
political accountability has any function in reining in prosecutors, their
work must be, in some sense, transparent. Direct control over the
prosecutor’s decisions similarly requires greater transparency.177 If the
public is going to enjoy greater participation, then it needs more
information about the decisions prosecutors are making, prosecutors’
reasons for making these decisions, and the processes by which decisions
are made. Perhaps greater public engagement in prosecutorial decision
making, in turn, would educate the public about the nature of the
criminal justice system.178
Transparency, which in other contexts can be key to accountability, is
more problematic for prosecutors, however. Much of what prosecutors
do is necessarily secret. Grand jury secrecy, enforced by statute, ensures
the safety of witnesses and the dignity of uncharged suspects.179 Secrecy
preserves the integrity of future or ongoing investigations and, at times,
protects national security.180 As discussed above, the public is not
particularly well suited to review discretionary decisions, and there is a
risk to prosecutorial independence when it does.
Even reforms in processes within prosecutors’ offices could work
together with transparency to create a closer alignment between
prosecutors’ interests and those of the public. While it is unrealistic
176. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 107–08
(2018) (discussing the aims of transparency policies during the Progressive Era and in
the decade between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, which included more
“efficient,” “egalitarian,” and “democratically accountable regulation”).
177. See Simonson, supra note 152, at 2205, 2216 (explaining that the public’s ability
to hold government officials accountable depends on the transparency of “the routine
appearances that make up criminal justice in [the public’s] neighborhoods”).
178. For a discussion of transparency and prosecutors, see generally Jessica A. Roth,
Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming Apr. 2020).
179. See JoEllen Lotvedt, Availability of Civil Remedies Under the Grand Jury Secrecy Rule,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 237, 241–42 (1997) (“[Grand jury] [s]ecrecy . . . protects the
anonymity of the witness pool and . . . prevents the release of derogatory information
about an unindicted individual.”).
180. See id. at 241 (“Maintaining secrecy decreases the possibility that a suspect may
escape, destroy evidence, or harass adverse witnesses.”).
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and undesirable to require prosecutors to reveal the details of each
decision, they could be required to reveal the mechanisms by which
they came to that decision and the evolving standards governing those
decisions. This would give the public an opportunity to supervise
prosecutors’ work without involving them in factual and legal inquiries
for which they are untrained and ill suited.
In addition, when the integrity of the institutions is in doubt,
transparency may trump independence. When the public ceases to
believe that the processes for ensuring loyalty and care are working, it
may be worth compromising the independence of prosecutors for the
sake of transparency and accountability.
B. Assessing Mechanisms for Prosecutorial Accountability
In a private fiduciary relationship, accountability can mean that the
beneficiary enjoys direct control over some or all of the fiduciary’s
work. This model of accountability does not and should not translate to
prosecutors’ work. As we discuss above and elsewhere, direct and plenary
control by political actors does not work to align prosecutors’ work with
the public interest.181 Once we conceive of the prosecutor’s objective as
seeking justice, not carrying out the contemporary public’s will in a more
general sense, it follows that direct control would be unwise.
Because prosecutors’ work is specialized in nature, it might be better
to hold them accountable to other prosecutors or to other knowledgeable
public officials or official bodies rather than to the public directly.182
When it comes to federal and other appointed prosecutors, the public
lacks removal authority in any event. At best, it can influence the
official who possesses the authority to remove the prosecutor. In
federal cases, public influence is especially attenuated because the
President has direct authority to fire only the Attorney General and

181. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 71 (“The discretion of . . . prosecutors
promotes the fair and even-handed administration of justice . . . . American
prosecutors sometimes fail; but presidential influence over individual cases would only
make matters worse.” (footnotes omitted)).
182. See O’Brien, supra note 140, at 1046–47 (“Research on accountability
demonstrates that decision makers come closest to this ideal when they know that they
will be judged primarily for the process of their decision making, as opposed to the
outcome. This sort of accountability could come through internal procedures, by way
of review within a prosecutor’s office, or through an outside agency’s supervision.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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United States Attorneys,183 not subordinate prosecutors.184 And it is
unlikely given the many public concerns that voters are motivated by
federal prosecutorial policy when they cast their vote for president.
With respect to elected prosecutors, the public does not presently have
enough information to assess whether prosecutors are faithful to
professional norms.185 But even if prosecutors were substantially more
transparent, it is doubtful whether voters’ criterion would be whether
prosecutors were “seeking justice” as that concept is understood in the
legal profession.
Other public officials or official bodies might be particularly good at
offering input or monitoring the extrinsic factors that go into prosecutorial
decision making. They too would be removed from the facts of individual
cases, making it hard for them to monitor discretionary decisions in that
regard. But they might serve as good proxies for public opinion on other
factors, even those that straddle the line between concerns intrinsic and
extrinsic to criminal justice, like how much prosecutors ought to consider
social or racial justice or mass incarceration.
Additionally, accountability can mean being subject to some
procedural mechanism to ensure that one meets one’s responsibilities
and can be removed from one’s position when one does not live up to
the applicable standard. For public officials, accountability in this sense
may or may not imply some public transparency, depending on whether
the removal process involves a public election or an act by a supervisory
official or body. Even in an electoral process, it is not obvious what must
be publicly disclosed and when. The answer presumably turns, at least
in part, on the nature of the official’s responsibilities—on what it means
to do the job well or poorly.

183. 28 USC § 541(c) (2012).
184. § 542(b) (Assistant United States Attorneys are subject to removal by the
Attorney General). Further, the termination of a subordinate prosecutor is subject to
review and reversal by the Merit Systems Protection Board. See, e.g., Goekev. Dep’t of
Justice, 2015 M.S.P.B. 1, 2 (2015).
185. Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 117 (2017) (“[T]he
political check on elected prosecutors does not work well because voters lack sufficient
information about their prosecutors’ enforcement priorities.”); Richman, supra note
4, at 963 (“[E]ven direct elections are not likely to prove an effective means of giving
prosecutors guidance as to a community’s enforcement priorities or of holding them
accountable for the discretionary decisions that they have already made.”); Ronald F.
Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 591 (2009)
(“[P]rosecutor elections . . . do not assure that the public knows and approves of the
basic policy priorities and implementation of policy in the prosecutor’s office.”).
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A fiduciary theory of prosecutors suggests that monitoring the processes
of decision making would be the optimal way to hold prosecutors
accountable. Public officials giving input into extrinsic considerations that
ought to drive discretionary decisions might also prove useful in aligning
the interest of the prosecutor with that of the beneficiary.
C. Fiduciary Theory of Governance Revisited
Analyzing prosecutors as fiduciaries contributes to the developing
fiduciary theory of governance. The question of accountability and
independence is not as central for most other public officials. But the
general tension between the two values is relevant to some extent for
all public fiduciaries. Are leaders picked to use their judgment,
knowledge, and skill on behalf of the public or are they expected to be
more directly accountable to the electorate’s will?186 The answer, it
seems, is both. The proper balance will depend on the role and
responsibilities of different public officials, but to some degree,
expertise—which is fostered by a kind of exclusivity—and popular
responsiveness must go hand in hand.
Our examination of prosecutors’ fiduciary role does suggest a
critique of fiduciary theory: it tends to exalt the value of discretion. As
Paul Miller argues, the fiduciary by definition exercises discretionary
power over the interests of the beneficiary.187 In the private law context,
scholars have argued that this definition of fiduciary obligation does a
disservice to the principal, diminishing the principal’s power and
rationalizing a paternalistic relationship. The agent should serve the
principal. The fiduciary should take direction from the beneficiary.188
Of course, when the beneficiary has a vast and complex amalgam of
abstract interests as the fiduciary governance model points out,
minimizing discretion is difficult, if not impossible. And even if it were
possible, it is not necessarily desirable.
In the context of governance, Seth Davis has expressed an analogous
concern. He argues that the fiduciary model generally minimizes and

186. See generally SOPHIA ROSENFELD, DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH: A SHORT HISTORY 15,
20, 26 (2019) (arguing that truth has been contested throughout American history
and ought to be a collaboration between experts in government and the lay public).
187. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011).
188. See W. Bradley Wendel, Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law, or Both?
(forthcoming) (on file with authors) (describing the fiduciary theory that the agent
should “interpret the instructions of the principal . . . in accordance with the agent’s
understanding of the principal’s wishes”).
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at times can mask domination and hegemony.189 There is reason to be
concerned about this dynamic in prosecution in particular.190 In fact,
some have argued that domination under the mantel of fiduciary
service characterizes the criminal justice system in general.191 It is no
surprise that scholars of the criminal justice system who are concerned
with minority rights and protecting the less powerful seek to restrict
rather than expand or justify discretion.192
Broad discretionary power is dangerous. It risks not only abuse but
also a more insidious form of power in which expert dominance takes
on the guise of disinterestedness. If we assume that professionals are
particularly good at assessing what is in the public interest and particularly
well suited to avoid this kind of dynamic, then perhaps the fiduciary
model of prosecutorial power could avoid this critique. But ever since the
1970s, scholars and critics have shown just how central professions and
other experts have been to just this sort of social control.193
That said, discretion in the exercise of government power is
inevitable.194 And discretion in the application of the criminal laws is
no exception. As we explained above, allowing the public direct
control over intrinsic factors that go into decisions in individual cases
is not only impracticable but also potentially dangerous.195 Thus, we
are stuck with Paul Miller’s definition of a fiduciary.196 A more direct

189. Seth Davis, Pluralism and the Public Trust, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 281, 288–
99 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds, 2018).
190. See Davis, supra note 4, at 408–15 (describing prosecutors’ discretion and
abuses of such discretion that result in a level of control over the accused).
191. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 1–15 (2010) (likening the domination over people of color and
the poor that resulted from the “government’s zealous . . . efforts to address rampant
drug crime” during the War on Drugs beginning in the 1980s to the Jim Crow-era
racial caste system).
192. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 4, at 400, 409–10 & n.63 (suggesting that prosecutors’
discretionary decisions may be the result of bias, like unconscious racism, and
proposing reforms to hold prosecutors accountable to their constituents).
193. See Roiphe, supra note 146, at 675, 677 (explaining scholars’ critique of lawyers
who “substitut[ed] their own political and ideological agenda[s] for those of the . . .
communit[ies] for whom they were purportedly fighting” and scholars’ increasing
focus on a theory of lawyers as “zealous advocate[s]” and “minimiz[ing of] the
professional obligation to society as a whole”).
194. H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 663–64 (2013).
195. See supra Section III.A.2.
196. See Miller, supra note 187, at 262 (defining a fiduciary relationship as “one in
which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical
interests of another (the beneficiary)” (emphasis added)).
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control over prosecution would risk partisan influence or a powerful
faction controlling prosecutors’ decisions. It could also involve those
without experience or knowledge who will likely act in an arbitrary way
inconsistent with the public interest in criminal justice.
Independence should be protected when it can foster expertise,
experience, and professional pride. While they should never go
unchecked, these aspects can be harnessed to promote processes and
norms that will tend toward good social outcomes. In order to do that,
prosecutors and public officials in general need to be insulated from the
public. But, expertise is not infallible; experience is not incorruptible.
To make sure that these processes do not get coopted or ignored for the
private ends of individual officials or corrupted by implicit bias and
other distortions in decision making, the public has a right to monitor
their public officials. The proper degree of input and control from the
public will depend on the particular official and the nature of his or
her role. Some functions are better performed in isolation, protected
from public clamor; others are better aired in public, performed in
collaboration with the beneficiary.
With regard to prosecutors, the best way to ensure this balance is to
insulate prosecutors in making discretionary decisions in individual
cases but require them to be more deliberate, rational, and transparent
in developing processes to make these decisions. In addition to
implementing regular procedures, prosecutors’ offices should be
transparent both about the policies motivating their decisions and how
the decisions are made.
Bringing this insight to bear on the fiduciary theory of governance
in general leads to the conclusion that the nature of the fiduciary
relationship between public officials and the electorate is complex and
depends on the nature of the office. The best way to ensure faithful
principals is by employing all possible mechanisms to ensure that the
official is accountable to the public in a way that respects and preserves
the unique nature of his or her expertise and experience.197 While the
mechanism of doing so will vary depending on the official’s role and
responsibilities, the goal remains constant.
Political officials ought to educate the public about the role of
different officials and institution and avoid spreading misinformation
197. Evan Criddle has essentially made this argument about federal administrative
agencies. Under the fiduciary model, administrative agencies are not anti-democratic
but rather fiduciaries. The key in the relationship is to foster accountability while
preserving an arena for expert deliberation. Criddle, supra note 51, at 447–49.
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that might undermine the norms that have developed over the years.198
In order to enhance accountability, public officials who are in the right
position to do so should clarify what the norms and processes that govern
their role are and why they are necessary for the proper functioning of
government.199 A faithful public servant should be responsible not just for
making decisions according to these norms and traditions but for
educating the public about how important they are.200
CONCLUSION
This Article introduces the fiduciary theory of prosecution not as a
fully developed proposal but as an invitation for further inquiry. In
addition to reframing old debates in a new and potentially helpful way,
the theory raises novel questions about how prosecutors ought to
function and offers broad outlines to be filled in. We invite others to
join us in developing this theory, which, unlike other theories of
prosecution, is firmly rooted in history and tradition.

198. Many have accused the Trump Administration of failing to live up to this
responsibility. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Trump Team is Running a Disinformation
Campaign About Russian Interference, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/08/01/the-trump-teamsvast-disinformation-campaign-about-russian-interference; Max Boot, Donald Trump’s
Biggest Disinformation Campaign Yet, FOREIGN POL’Y: VOICE (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/31/donald-trumps-biggest-disinformationcampaign-yet [https://perma.cc/VDJ8-DENF]; David Rhode, How Disinformation
Reaches Donald Trump, NEW YORKER: NEWS DESK (Oct. 3, 2019),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-disinformation-reaches-donaldtrump [https://perma.cc/N3VY-NLY3].
199. Some officials seem to intuit this role. In giving a press conference after
charging Michael Cohen—President Trump’s personal lawyer—in federal court,
Deputy United States Attorney Rob Khuzami not only announced the charges but also
explained the importance of the laws and the equal application of those laws. Robert
Khuzami Statement on Michael Cohen Case, CSPAN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?450331-1/lead-prosecutor-speaks-reporters-michael-cohen-guiltyplea [https://perma.cc/MKP2-P4L3] (“The rule of law applies . . . . It is our
commitment [as law enforcement] that we will pursue . . . those who choose to break
the law and vindicate the majority of people who lead law-abiding lives . . . . The
message is that we are here, prosecutors are here . . . we are a nation of laws and the
essence [of] . . . this case . . . is justice[:] . . . that is[,] an equal playing field for all
persons in the eyes of the law.”).
200. See Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The
Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1211–13 (2009)
(describing lawyers as civics teachers who have “an obligation to convey to clients
[their] understanding of proper civic conduct”).
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The principle value of the fiduciary theory of prosecution is not
prescriptive in the following sense. It does not tell prosecutors what to
do, except perhaps when it comes to extreme conduct that prosecutors
should avoid under virtually any understanding of their function.
Because it places discretion at the center of prosecutors’ work and asks
prosecutors to act in service of an amorphous beneficiary with a vague
objective, it cannot dictate particular decisions in concrete situations.
The theory does prescribe, in broad outline, how prosecutors should
reach decisions, but not the decisions they should ultimately reach. In
other words, a fiduciary theory of prosecution requires a certain
process for decision making but not particular outcomes. Observers
cannot use the theory to evaluate or critique charging or pleabargaining decisions because the relevant facts about prosecutors’
decision-making processes will rarely be available. Nor does the theory,
in itself, help answer whether traditional, progressive, or other styles of
prosecuting are preferable.
The theory’s value is primarily explanatory. To begin with, the fiduciary
theory makes sense of, and legitimates, conventional understandings of
the prosecutor’s role, including the idea of prosecution as a public trust,
the requirement of prosecutorial independence, and most importantly,
the prosecutorial duty to seek justice. The theory offers insight into the
meaning and significance of the vague duty to seek justice and
underscores that, as fiduciaries, prosecutors have further duties—in
particular, duties of care and loyalty. These other duties are not
themselves elements of “justice” but rather are legal imperatives
governing how prosecutors should pursue justice. Further, the theory
offers a new distinction between prosecutors’ pursuit of justice as opposed
to other relevant social policy objectives (while acknowledging that the
distinctions are not always clear and that there is sometimes overlap),
and it gives priority to the pursuit of conventional criminal justice
interests. Consequently, the theory both gives greater clarity to the
defining concept of “seeking justice” and shows how and why there is
more to prosecutors’ work than this pursuit.
Fiduciary theory also contributes to our understanding of how to
regulate prosecutors. By demonstrating that accountability and
independence are two mechanisms designed to align prosecutors’
interests with those of the public, fiduciary theory suggests regulatory
reforms that maximize both. Scholars and critics of the criminal justice
system often point to the insulation of prosecutors from outside
regulation as cause for concern. This may be true, but any effort at
reform must be careful not to sacrifice too much in prosecutorial
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independence for the sake of transparency or direct public
accountability because independence, too, is essential in aligning
prosecutors’ work with the interest of the beneficiary.
And perhaps most importantly, fiduciary theory helps justify some
features of prosecuting that many find frustrating, including that
different prosecutors evidently take different approaches to
discretionary decision making, resulting in disparate outcomes on
similar facts; that prosecutors often seem to act undemocratically,
ignoring public preferences; and that prosecutors often give no
explanations for the controversial decisions they make. These
frustrations are understandable and, to some extent, can be addressed.
As we suggest, both internal and external processes can strike a better
balance between prosecutors’ accountability and independence.
Further, the processes for training, electing, appointing, and hiring
prosecutors can better identify lawyers who will exercise good
judgment in their fiduciary role. But, in the end, the fiduciary theory
reminds us that the essential features of prosecutorial decision making
and regulation, which may give one pause, are neither arbitrary nor
the product of a political process in which prosecutors have
accumulated power for its own sake. These features grow out of a long
legal tradition, undergirded by a theory, that casts prosecutors as
fiduciaries, a professional role with significant substantive and
procedural implications. With prosecutors’ power, comes fiduciary
responsibilities. And that should be a source of some comfort.

